Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 57

Issue 1

Article 6

1991

Is the Federal Aviation Administration Kicking the Dog: Pilot
Disciplinary Proceedings and the Self-Incrimination Privilege
Jamey Holmes

Recommended Citation
Jamey Holmes, Is the Federal Aviation Administration Kicking the Dog: Pilot Disciplinary Proceedings and
the Self-Incrimination Privilege, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 297 (1991)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol57/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

IS THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
"KICKING THE DOG?": PILOT DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS AND THE SELFINCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
JAMEY HOLMES

I.

INTRODUCTION

BY VIRTUE OF the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the
Act),' every pilot in the United States must be examined and certified by the Federal Aviation Adminstration (FAA). 2 Periodically, the Administrator of the FAA
may re-examine the fitness and qualifications of these individuals and, in the interest of public safety, may issue
orders modifying, suspending, or revoking their certificates. 3 The Act also establishes elaborate administrative
and judicial processes for the implementation of certificate actions.4 Significantly, while these processes provide
the defendant pilots with many of the traditional
hallmarks of due process, courts have denied these pilots
the right to refuse to divulge self-incriminatory testimony. 5 Under current standards, federal authorities may
revoke or suspend the license of a pilot on the strength of
his own testimony.
The fifth amendment, in its broadest form, is available
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
Id. § 1430(a). Section 1430(a)(1) provides that it shall be "unlawful" to operate an aircraft without a valid certificate issued by the FAA. Id.
2

3 Id. § 1429(a).
Id.; see infra notes 35-78 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Roach v. NTSB, 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S.

1006 (1988).
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only to criminal defendants. 6 The privilege entitles such
individuals to refuse to take the witness stand or answer
any inquiries at their own trial. 7 A more limited self-incrimination privilege is extended to all witnesses regardless of the form of the proceedings. 8 It confers the right
to refuse to disclose any information which poses a reasonable threat of future criminal prosecution. 9 For these
purposes, courts generally agree that all punitive sanctions are criminal.' 0 Furthermore, they recognize that
even ostensibly civil sanctions may be punitive in their application and effect.t" An affirmative finding on either account is sufficient to activate the protection of the fifth
amendment.
The refusal of the courts to extend the privilege to pilots facing decertification is based largely on their determination that certificate actions are neither punitive by
design nor in their application and effect.' 2 With regard
to the former conclusion, the courts often note, for example, that criminal punishment is characterized by the intent to punish an offender.' 3 Thus, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, writing in the late 19th century, remarked,
"[E]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked."' 4 Because the certificate action is an
integral part of a vital regulatory act, courts generally find
that the intent of Congress in providing for revocations
5
and suspensions was primarily remedial.'
The latter consideration recognizes that the sanction
may be intended as a civil penalty but in its purpose and
CONST. amend. V.
Id.; see infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 103-141 and accompanying text.
9Id.
,0See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
I) See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980); see infra notes
147-150, 153-168 and accompanying text.
I2 Roach, 804 F.2d at 1153-54.
,5See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
0 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 3 (1881).
0.
,5 Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154.

6 U.S.
7
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effect be purely punitive.' 6 This is true, for example, if
the ostensibly civil penalty bears no rational relation to
the damage caused by the transgression.' 7 While the
courts uniformly recognize this notion, they have adopted
a very deferential position. If the court finds that Congress intended a particular sanction as a mere "civil penalty," current standards require the "clearest proof" of
punitive effect to negate that intention.' In the absence
of such proof, the defendant is not extended the constitutional protections guaranteed to "true" criminal
defendants.
The reluctance of the courts to scrutize these sanctions
more closely has led to an increased use of civil penalties
as a means of enforcement, particularly of administrative
regulations.' 9 In essence, the courts relieved the government of many of the severe burdens it carries in criminal
prosecutions.2 0 At the same time, however, the courts
have at least partially abdicated their most central function - the protection of the rights of the accused. In fact,
by adopting this approach, the courts have permitted the
legislature to dictate the constitutional rights of defend,6 Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
1 See Charney, The Need for ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Defendant in Civil Penalty
Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 497-500 (1974).
18 Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
19 See

Charney, supra note 17, at 481-82.
Id. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1014, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972). In discussing
proposed changes to the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 814-15, 817,
822, 831, 844 (1977) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 814-15, 817, 822, 831, 844
(1988)), the Senate Report notes the advantages of civil penalties and discusses
the administrative burdens of criminal process:
Penalties provided for violations of many of the provisions of the
Shipping Act of 1916 are criminal. Where there appears to have
been a violation of one of these provisions it is necessary to conduct
an investigation of the incident, to thoroughly document the violation, and then to refer it to the Department of Justice for prosecu20

tion. Adequate documentation is time consuming .... Additional

time and effort is expended by the Department in its review and
evaluation of the offense. ...
To change the penalties for violations of these provisions from
criminal to civil should make the documentation of violations simpler ....
S. REP. No. 1014 at 2-3.

300

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[57

ants through a mere choice of labels.' In short, pilots are
refused the fifth amendment rights of more traditional
criminal defendants largely on the basis of a perceived remedial congressional intent and the absence of "clearest
proof" of a contrary impact.2 2 To borrow from the language of Justice Holmes, the courts have concluded that
Congress never intended to "kick" the pilots, but merely
stumbled over them as it groped toward heightened public safety.
The following Comment takes the position that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination should be
extended to pilots facing decertification. It addresses the
issue from three perspectives: first, it argues that pilot
decertification actions are criminal in nature and that
therefore, all constitutional safeguards applicable to criminal defendants should be available to the pilot.2 3 This
discussion focuses on the fact that certificate actions bear
many of the traditional hallmarks of criminal punishment.
For example, they entail severe economic losses, involuntary loss of property rights, and the imposition of a stigma
among the profession. Furthermore, certificate actions
unrelated to the pilot's technical qualifications are purely
punitive, strong indicia of criminal punishment. Finally,
in contrast to purely regulatory sanctions, decertification
does not perform a compensatory function.
Secondly, this Comment proposes that the proceedings
are, at a minimum, "quasi-criminal. ' 24 In a long line of
cases, the Supreme Court has held that certain proceedings, although civil with regard to other constitutional
protections, are sufficiently criminal for purposes of invoking the self-incrimination privilege. 25 While property
forfeitures by reason of an offense are sufficiently criminal
Charney, supra note 17, at 482.
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
23 See infra notes 214-298 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 299-330 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971) (property forfeiture); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693 (1965) (same); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) (same).
21
22
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to trigger the protection of the fifth amendment, for example, they do not activate the double jeopardy or due
proces clauses of the fourth amendment.2 6 The protection of the fifth amendment, the Court has stated, is
"broader" than that of other constitutional safeguards.27
Finally, this Comment recognizes that the testimony of
pilots in such circumstances could form the basis of subsequent criminal charges. 8 Many state laws make various
forms of reckless or unsafe operation of an aircraft a criminal act.2 9 Thus, the testimony elicited from the pilot is
often co-extensive with that necessary to establish a crime.
In the absence of a grant of immunity, denial of the privilege to refuse to answer specific inquiries under these circumstances may subject the pilot to a "real and
substantial" threat of future criminal prosecution. 0
The following discussion begins with a brief sketch of
the usual course of pilot disciplinary proceedings. Section III then discusses the applications of the fifth amendment generally and the scope of the self-incrimination
privilege.3 ' It notes both the witness' privilege as well as
the defendant's privilege. Section IV focuses on the pivotal issue of the classification of sanctions as criminal or
civil, and discusses various means by which the courts
have attempted to rationalize the distinction. 2 Section V
examines the current availability of the fifth amendment
26 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-34.
21 See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3 (1938); United States v.

Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 50 (1914).
28 See infra notes 231-344 and accompanying text.
- See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-1-108 (1990)(operation of planes in violation
of federal registration requirements); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 41-2-102 (West Supp.
1990) (operation of plane while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 28-1465, 28-1466 (1989)(operation of aircraft while under the influence of alcohol or narcotics); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 245-46 (McKinney
1988)(careless or reckless operation of aircraft); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
46f-1 (West Supp. 199 1)(taking off, maneuvering, or landing a plane on a road or
highway except in time of emergency).
-1 See, e.g., Roach v. NTSB, 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1006 (1988); People v. Agnew, 107 Colo. 399, 113 P.2d 424 (1941).
3 See infra notes 79-141 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 142-187 and accompanying text.
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privilege against self-incrimination in decertification proceedings through an analysis of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board."3
Finally, Section VI offers various arguments in support of
extending the privilege to decertification proceedings.3 4
II.

THE PILOT DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

As previously noted, the Federal Aviation Act 3 5 requires
every pilot in the United States to be examined and certified by the Federal Aviation Administration. 6 In this regard, the Act empowers the FAA to evaluate the
performance and qualifications of persons applying for pilot certification 37 and to periodically re-examine their
qualifications. 38 The FAA also promulgates rules and regulations establishing minimum standards for the maintenance of flight safety39 and in the interest of public safety,
may initiate enforcement proceedings and impose penalties. 40 The agency reviews alleged violations through an
administrative and judicial process 4 ' and potential sanctions include money fines and the "amending, modifying,
42
suspending or revoking of an airman's certificate."
13

804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 188-211 and accompanying

text.
See infra notes 212-344 and accompanying text.
-5 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
3
49 U.S.C. app. § 1430(a). See supra note 1.
-, Id. § 1422(a). In order to qualify for a certificate, an applicant must demonstrate a certain level of competency and knowledge, and he must hold a medical
certificate appropriate for the flying to be done. Id. § 1422(b)(1).
38 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429 (1988).
In fact, recently-enacted regulations require
the airmen themselves to report certain occurrences reflecting on their qualifications to the FAA. Pilots Convicted of Alcohol- or Drug-Related Motor Vehicle
Offenses or Subject to State Motor Vehicle Administrative Procedures, 55 Fed.
Reg. 31,300, 31,309 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 61, 67) (proposed Aug.
1, 1990). If the examiner finds that "safety in air commerce or air transportation
and the public interest requires," the Administrator is empowered to suspend or
revoke the pilot's license. Id.; V. ROLLO, AVIATION LAw: AN INTRODUCTION 214,
217 (1985).
30 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a).
40 Id. § 1354.
4' Id. §§ 1471,
1473(b),(c); Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.1513.16 (1990).
42 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429.
-4
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In furtherance of its enforcement powers, the Act gives
the FAA the authority to investigate reported violations of
the Act itself, and FAA Regulations and orders of the Administrator.43 The Act also provides that investigative
proceedings may be commenced through a third party
complaint or on the Administrator's own initiative. With
regard to the former, any individual may file a complaint
with the Administrator, and where reasonable grounds
exist, the FAA shall investigate. 44 Alternatively, the Administrator may begin an investigation at any time on its
own initiative as to any matter within its jurisdiction and
concerning which a complaint is authorized to be made.45
In either case, the Administrator typically has the option of "administrative" or "legal" enforcement actions.46
Essentially, administrative actions are warnings, analogous to warning citations issued by police officers.4 7 They
may be used only when "no significant unsafe condition
or lack of competency exists."' 48 Furthermore, the violation must have been inadvertent, and the violator must
have a "good attitude. '49 Administrative sanctions differ
from their legal counterparts in that no "substantive
rights, privileges, or property" are denied the party
against whom the action is taken. 50 In most cases, successful corrective action by the violator will avoid any fur43 49 U.S.C. app. § 1354(a) (1988); 14 C.F.R. § 13.3(a) (1990). Under § 13.3(a)
of the Federal Aviation Regulations, the Administrator may "conduct investigations, hold hearings, issue subpoenas, require the production of relevant documents, records, and property, and take evidence and depositions." 14 C.F.R.
§ 13.3(a) (1990).
4 49 U.S.C. app. § 1482(a) (1988); 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.1(a), 13.5(a) (1990).
4 49 U.S.C. app. § 1482(b); 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(i) (1990).
46 ROLLO, supra note 38, at 202-03. Legal actions are authorized by the Act. See,
e.g., 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1429(a)-(c), 1471, 1473, 1487a (1988) (authorizing certificate actions, civil penalties, aircraft seizure, and injunctions). Similarly, authority
for adminstrative actions can be found in the Federal Aviation Regulations. See,
e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.11(b)(1), 13.11(b)(2) (1990) (authorizing warning notices
and letters of correction).
47
48
49

ROLLO, supra note 38, at 202.
Id.
Id.

'oId.
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ther sanction. 5 ' Conversely, failure to take proper
corrective action may result in the instigation of legal proceedings. Significantly, there is no right of appeal from
an FAA administrative action.55
Legal enforcement proceedings are generally initiated
for more serious infractions or as an additional sanction
for failure to respond to an administrative action.5 These
actions are also wide-ranging. They include certificate actions, civil penalties, and injunctions to enforce compliance with the orders and authorizations of the
Administrator. 55 Typically, suspensions are limited to instances of operational infractions or where the operator's
practices have demonstrated a lack of competence which
can be corrected by remedial action.5 6 Suspensions may,
however, be imposed for purely disciplinary reasons.
The FAA generally seeks revocation of a certificate only
in very specific circumstances. The Administrator typically will not revoke a pilot's certificate unless there is a
deficiency of qualification which cannot be corrected in
the short-term through remedial action, a demonstrated
unwillingness to comply with air safety requirements, or
where public policy otherwise demands such action.5 8
The Administrator may, however, revoke a certificate if
the violator possesses the necessary technical operating
skills but exhibits a lack of good judgment.59
Monetary or "civil" penalties are an alternative to the
certificate actions. These penalties are particularly attractive in instances in which certificate actions would be unduly harsh or simply insufficient.'
The Administrator
51 Id.
52

Id. at 202-03.

"

Id.

- Id. at 203.
51 See supra note 46.
- ROLLO, supra note 38, at 203.
57 Id.
58 Id.

-9 See, e.g., Specht v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958).
- ROLLO, supra note 38, at 203. The Act states that any person who violates a
federal aviation safety regulation shall be subject to a civil penalty. 49 U.S.C. app.
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may also subject any aircraft owned by the offender and
actually used in the violation to a lien in the amount of the
penalty. 6 In any case, the Administrator has the power to
compromise any penalty.62 Significantly, civil penalties
are usually not instituted when there has been a certificate
action or criminal punishment for the same offense; this
policy avoids the appearance of double jeopardy.63
Unless the Administrator determines that the situation
requires otherwise, an initial inquiry by the FAA investigators follows the commencement of an enforcement action. 64 The national or regional FAA counsel then
reviews the findings and recommendations of the investigators. Typically, counsel then issues a letter to the violator, which serves as notice of the proposed action and
details the factual allegations and the specific violations
alleged by the FAA.65
In the case of civil penalties, this letter generally takes
the form of an offer to compromise the administration's
claim. 6 It sets forth the amount which the Administrator
will accept in full settlement of the alleged violation. If a
certificate action is proposed, a similar letter is issued, detailing whether suspension or revocation has been pro§ 1471(a) (1988). In most cases, the maximum penalty is $1,000. In cases involving hazardous materials, however, the fine may amount to $10,000. Id. The determination of the precise amount of the fine is determined from the "nature,
circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation." Id
61 49 U.S.C. app. § 1471(b) (1988).
62 Id. § 1471(a)(2).
63 ROLLO, supra note 38, at 203-04.
Id. at 206.
65 Id. If the Administrator finds that there is a need for emergency action, the
FAA is authorized to issue such orders as are necessary without prior notice or
opportunity to be heard by the alleged violators. Id. at 207. For example, the Act
provides for immediately-effective certificate actions under emergency circumstances. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429 (1988). In order to provide some semblance of
due process, however, the Act also provides for an accelerated appeals process to
the NTSB. Id. The NTSB must dispose of the case within 60 days from the date
on which it is first notified of its pendency. Id. Similarly, if the Administrator has
discovered a mechanical or design defect in aviation products of similar design, he
may issue an airworthiness directive, prohibiting the operation of any product
covered by the directive except in accordance with its requirements. 14 C.F.R.
§ 39 (1990). For a general discussion, see RoLLo, supra note 38, at 207.
- ROLLO, supra note 38, at 206.
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posed, and in the case of the former, the length of the
proposed suspension.
In response to this letter, the alleged violator may
transmit the amount suggested in the letter or surrender
his certificate for suspension or revocation, or he may
submit an answer to the letter, requesting that it be considered in connection with the final disposition of the letter's allegations. 6 Alternatively, he may request an
informal conference with the FAA counsel or the formal
disposition of the case through National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) proceedings. After exhausting all
available administrative remedies, he may also appeal any
decision to the United States Courts of Appeals.6 9
If the alleged violator cannot reach an agreement with
the FAA regarding the charges, the Administrator may initiate formal proceedings. 70 For example, in the case of a
certificate action, the FAA will issue an Order of Certificate Action, including the Administrator's findings of fact,
specifications of the regulations violated, and the sanction
imposed. Similarly, in civil penalty actions, failure to
reach an agreement with the Administrator will result in
the initiation of United States District Court proceedings
by the FAA. In these actions, the FAA typically seeks the
maximum statutory penalty. 7 '
Significantly, the Act empowers the respondent to appeal the decision of the Administrator to the NTSB for an
adjudication on the merits.72 Upon petition or appeal, the
NTSB assigns an administrative law judge (ALJ) to the
case. The ALJ conducts a formal proceeding and makes
initial findings of fact and conclusions of law. He is not
bound by any findings of the Administrator, and he has
the power and duty to ascertain the facts.73 All parties
Id.
8 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 207.
7 Id.
72 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).
7s 49 C.F.R. § 821.35 (1990).
67
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have the opportunity to present evidence and make arguments in support of their case, and a formal record of the
proceedings is made.74 Unless reviewed by the NTSB, the
decision of the ALJ is final.75
The NTSB may review the findings of the ALJ on its
own initiative or through an appeal by either party.76 In
either case, the extent of the review is extremely limited.
The NTSB may examine only whether (1) the findings of
the ALJ are supported by a preponderance of reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ's conclusions were made in accordance with precedent and policy;
(3) the questions on appeal are substantial; and (4) any
prejudicial errors have occurred.77 The findings of the
NTSB are final. Therefore, at this point, having exhausted all administrative remedies, the respondent may
appeal to the appropriate United States Court of
Appeals.78
III.
A.

FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION

In General

The fifth amendment provides in part that "no man
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."' 79 This privilege arose largely out of the
Framers' conviction that "too high a price may be paid...
for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law and
that, in its attainment, other social objects ... should not
be sacrificed." 80 More specifically, the privilege reflects a
distinct preference for an adversarial process as opposed
74 Id.
75 Id.

§§ 821.37-821.40 (1990).
§ 821.43 (1990).
76Id. §§ 821.43, 821.47. If it chooses to review the findings sua sponte, the
NTSB must file its request within twenty days of the ALJ's decision. Id. § 821.43.
In addition, either party may appeal the findings by filing and serving notice of
appeal upon the opposing counsel within ten days of the decision. Id. § 821.47.
77 Id. § 821.49.
7 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486 (1988).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
o Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944).

79
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to the inquisitorial one of seventeenth century England."'
The Framers rejected the historical English practice of
summoning individuals into court and questioning them
under oath before lodging a formal accusation against
them. In such cases, the reluctant accused typically faced
the somber choices of "contempt for failure to respond,
conviction of the charge being investigated, or torture to
8' 2
overcome his resistance.
The privilege also illustrates various evidentiary and social policy objectives.8 3 For example, it reveals the Frama,Ribble, Origin and Development, 5 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMPILATION 1, 1-2
(1954).
82 M. BERGER, TAKING THE Firm 25 (1980).
The use of compelled self-incrimination fell out of favor in England and the colonies by 1641. Ribble, supra note
81, at 3. In that year, Parliament abolished both of the primary inquisitorial bodies, the Court of the High Commission and the Star Chamber. Id.
The major catalyst for these events was the sensational heresy trial of John
Lilburne in 1641. During the course of the proceedings, the prosecution sought
to question him concerning other charges. Lilburne refused to answer such questions, stating:
I am not willing to answer you to any more of these questions, because I see you go about this examination ... to ensnare me; for,
seeing the things for which I am imprisoned cannot be proved
against me, you will get other matter out of my examination. If I had
been proceeded against by a bill, I would have answered.
Id. at 3.
Although the court convicted Lilburne and sentenced him to be whipped and
pilloried, he later made a complaint to Parliament and was subsequently vindicated. Parliament also ordered the payment of 3,000 pounds as reparations. Id.
Also in 1641, Massachusetts enacted "The Body of Liberties" which included
two explicit prohibitions on compelled self-incrimination. First, it prohibited the
use of torture to extricate confessions in non-capital cases, and secondly, it provided that no man "shall be bound to inform, present, or reveal any private crime
or offense wherein there is no peril to this plantation or any member.., thereof."
Id. at 5. Thus, with the somewhat dubious exception of the witch trials, the privilege was well-rooted in the colonies by the late 17th century. Id. at 7.
For a more complete discussion of the historical origins of the fifth amendment
in the United States see M. BERGER, supra at 1-25; Ribble, supra note 81, at 1-9;
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949).
83 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). Justice Goldberg's
statement of the principles of the fifth amendment privilege in Murphy is perhaps
the most influential and widely-cited. Writing for the court, he stated:
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and most
noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice; our fear that self incriminating statements will be
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ers' desire for a prophylactic rule to avoid abuses by the
police in their interrogations and their belief that an individual has a right to be let alone absent good cause for
intrusion into his privacy.'" Similarly, it recognizes that
self-condemnatory statements may be unreliable either
because of the defendant's fear of perjury and contempt
charges or a "death-wish" mentality."5 Recognizing the
significance of these concerns, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]his provision [of the amendment] must
have a broad construction in favor of the right which it
was intended to secure."'8 6 Furthermore, the Court has

noted that it has been "zealous
to safeguard the values
87
that underlie the privilege.

Significantly, these policy objectives largely determine
the contours of the modern privilege. 8 Because modern
techniques of acquiring self-incriminatory information are
more indirect and subtle, confining the privilege to its historical origins (e.g., the extraction of confessions through
torture) would effectively render it useless in modern
practice. Twentieth century courts have, therefore, focused on the privilege's various policy concerns and developed a broader, more inclusive privilege.8 9 Questions
remain, however, regarding the relative importance of
these goals and their application. In the opinion of one
scholar, the result is a mere "shopping list of rationales"
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play
which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load"; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual
"to a private enclave where he may lead a private life"; our distrust
of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege,
while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often a "protection to
the innocent."
Id. (citations omitted); see also M. BERGER, supra note 82, at 25-44.
- M. BERGER, supra note 82, at 25-44.
'I

ld.

87

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).

- M. BERGER, supra note 82, at 25.
89 Id.
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from which the lower courts are left to pick and choose
without rational guidance. 9°
B.

The Defendant's Privilege

In a criminal proceeding, the fifth amendment provides
the defendant with an unqualified right to choose not to
testify in his own behalf.9 ' This "defendant's privilege"
entitles the individual to be free of any questions whatsoever. It rests on the assumption that upon examination
the prosecutor will seek to elicit only relevant, incriminatory facts from the defendant. Therefore, he should be
privileged to refuse to subject himself to any examination
92
as a matter of law.
The defendant's privilege is, however, subject to various limitations. For example, by its own terms the fifth
amendment applies only to "compelled" testimony.
Thus, the introduction at trial of the defendant's prior
deposition or voluntary grand jury testimony does not violate the defendant's privilege.93 This is true even though
it may essentially require the defendant to take the stand
- Id. at 26.
91 See, e.g., Roach v. NTSB, 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1006 (1988).
M. BERGER supra note 82, at 56-57. Significantly, documentary evidence
presents a special issue. Business records of the defendant, for example, may be
subpoenaed by the government or its agencies. Their production is protected by
the fifth amendment as testimony only if the preparation of the documents was
compelled. The production of voluntarily prepared personal papers is not privileged unless the act of producing them would, of itself, incriminate the holder.
Seventeenth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts
of Appeals 1986-1987 - The Fifth Amendment at Trial, 76 GEO. L.J. 1018, 1022-23
(1988) [hereinafter Annual Review]. Compare Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976) (documents must be prepared under compulsion in order to be protected
by fifth amendment) with United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984)(defendant is protected from forced delivery of incriminating documents, even
though voluntarily prepared, if the delivery essentially requires him to authenticate them).
9, Annual Review, supra note 92, at 1021; see also United States v. Babb, 807 F.2d
272 (1st Cir. 1986)(defendant's testimony at grand jury hearing admissible at
trial); United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1986)(deposition and
grand jury testimony admissible at trial when deposition given freely in civil action
arising out of same facts and defendant did not claim fifth amendment privilege
before testifying to grand jury), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 855 (1986).
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in order to rebut the prior testimony.94
Additionally, the privilege applies only to testimonial or
communicative evidence and may only be invoked if the
proceedings are criminal or "quasi-criminal" in nature,
and is available only to natural persons which of course
does not include corporations.95 More specifically, it does
not extend to proceedings to impose remedial or regulatory sanctions, 96 and it excludes evidence such as participation in a lineup,9 7 the demonstration of speech9" or
handwriting characteristics, 99 and the taking of a bloodalcohol test. 0 0
Finally, if the defendant elects to take the stand, he
waives the right to remain silent and must, on cross examination, answer all questions "reasonably related" to the
substance of his direct testimony.' 0 ' Any subsequent
claim of privilege is then subject to the limitations gener-4 Annual Review, supra note 92, at 1021.
95 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906)("[The] right of a person
under the [fifth [a]mendment to refuse to incriminate himself is a purely personal
privilege ... ").
In explaining its holding, the Court noted that corporations exist wholly apart
from their officers, directors, and shareholders and that the privilege never intended to permit an individual to plead the fact that some third person might be
incriminated by his testimony. Id. at 69-70. Furthermore, the Court stated, because corporations can act only through their agents, allowing them to assert the
privilege would in many cases deprive the courts of the only evidence of a corporate crime. Id. at 70.
Finally, the Court held that to extend the privilege to corporations would lead
to a "strange anomaly [sic]" in which the state lost power over organizations created and existing only under the state's authority. Id. at 75. Significantly, the continued power of the state to supervise the corporation and ensure that it abides by
its obligations also survives the corporation itself. For this reason, it has been
held that there is no fifth amendment obstacle to the compelled production of the
records of a defunct corporation, even though they had been transferred to individuals. See, e.g., Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Wheeler v. United
States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913). See generally M. BERGER, supra note 82, at 58-59.
- See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Roach, 804 F.2d at 1151.
97 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967).
- United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973).
Gilbert v. California, 38 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
1o Annual Review, supra note 92, at 1018; see also United States v. Kimberlin, 805
F.2d 210, 237 (7th Cir. 1986) (defendant directed to answer questions regarding
alibi because they were reasonably related to his testimony on direct), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1023 (1987); United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir.)(when
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10 2
ally applicable to the witness' privilege.

C.

The Witness' Privilege

In addition to the criminal defendant's privilege, the
fifth amendment can be asserted in "any proceeding, civil
or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosure that the
witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be
so used."'' 0 3 To invoke this privilege, the party must take
the stand, be sworn, and assert the privilege in response
to each allegedly incriminating question as it is asked." °
Although the witness and his counsel make the initial determination of entitlement ultimately this is a question for
the court. 10 5 Moreover, the burden of establishing the
availability of the privilege lies with the party invoking its
0
protection. 6
Significantly, the witness is not required to prove the
incriminating nature of the requested testimony "in the
sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court."'10 7 To impose such a requirement, the
Court has noted, would compel the witness "to surrender
the very protection the privilege is designed to guarantee."'' 08 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not established consistent standards regarding the level of proof
defendant took stand he waived privilege on cross examination as to those matters
put into issue by direct testimony), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985).
102 See infra notes 103-141 and accompanying text.
1- Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445; Roach, 804 F.2d at 1151.
1-4 Roach, 804 F.2d at 1151; United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir.
1974).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Ueckert v.
Commissioner, 721 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 1983).
- Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486; Roach, 804 F. 2d at 1151; Ueckert, 721 F.2d at 250.
In Hoffman, the Court stated, "[tihe witness is not exonerated from answering
merely because he declares that in doing so he would incriminate himself - his
say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to
say whether his silence is justified.
Hoffinan, 341 U.S. at 486.
107 Hoffmaan, 341 U.S. at 486.
'os Id
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necessary to establish the applicability of the privilege. 1° 9
The more restrictive of the standards is drawn from
Marchetti v. United States."10 In that case, the Court upheld
the fifth amendment claims of an individual charged with
evading federal statutes providing for registration and
taxation of individuals involved in illegal wagering."'
The defendant argued that the registration provisions of
the statute essentially required him to incriminate himself,
and the Supreme Court agreed. In holding for the defendant, the Court stated that the privilege is available
when testimony in question poses "substantial and 'real'
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of
2
incrimination." 1
In Hoffman v. United States,1'3 the Court took a much
more liberal approach. Therein, the majority stated that
"it need only be evident.., that a responsive answer...
might be dangerous" to the witness. 1 4 As a result, the
witness' claim is invalid only if "it is perfectly clear ... that
the answer[s] cannot possibly have" a tendency to incriminate. 115 Moreover, the Hoffmnan court held that the privilege extends beyond testimony that is of itself sufficient to
establish a crime and includes that which would merely
"furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant." ' 1 6 In the absence of specific guidance,
-oAnnual Review, supra note 92, at 1023-24.
to 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
- Id. at 61.
12 Id. at 53.
11
14

Hoffinan, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
Id. at 486-87 (emphasis added).

1- Id. at 488 (emphasis in original)(quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va.
892, 898 (1881)).
Significantly, however, the Hoffmnan court also stated in dicta that the protection
of the amendment "must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." Id. at 486. This language
is much closer to the Marchetti standard and seemingly contradicts the broader,
more inclusive standard enunciated in the Hoffman holding. Lower courts have,
on occasion, quoted the restrictive passage from Hoffman without reference to the
broad standard applied by that court. See, e.g., Roach, 804 F.2d at 1151.
ti6 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (citation omitted). Significantly, in a later opinion
styled Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965), the
Court further expanded the standard. In that case, the Court held that the privi-
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7
lower courts continue to apply both standards.'"
Significantly, under either standard, the determination
is essentially subjective." 18 In Hoffman, for example, the
Court stated that the trial judge "must be governed as
much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the
case as by the facts actually in evidence."" 9 Furthermore,
in 1972 the Court recognized the witness' own subjective
belief as a standard by which to determine the privilege's
applicability. 20 Specifically, in Kastigar v. United States,' 2 1
the Court held that the privilege protects against any "disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be
used [against him] in a criminal prosecution or could lead
to other evidence which might be so used."' 22 In the face
of such liberal standards, most courts have generally upheld the right of witnesses to refuse to answer questions
2
on grounds of self-incrimination. 3
The witness' privilege is, however, subject to various
limitations. For example, having voluntarily testified to a
fact, a witness cannot then refuse to give further details
unless disclosure would lead to further self-incrimination. 24 In fact, the Seventh Circuit held that a witness
lege was not limited to inquiries calling for directly incriminating responses but
also extended to those whose answers might provide clues to law enforcement
officials. Id. at 80-81. See aho L. TAYLOR, WrrINESS IMMUNITY 17-18 (1983).
1" Annual Review, supra note 92, at 1024. See, e.g., Kimberlin, 805 F.2d at 236-37
(questions seeking only names and destinations related to defendant's alibi
proper because they did not create a substantial threat of incriminating responses); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 1987) (following Hoffman, holding that witness entitled to privilege even though he had not
been charged, when testimony would have revealed close association with defendant at time of alleged robbery).
L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 18.
Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 487 (quoting Ex Parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1896)).
-2oL. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 18-19.
121 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
122

Id. at 444-45.

123 L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 19.
12
Annual Review, supra note 92, at 1024. An exception to this rule is provided
by Federal Rule of Evidence 608 which allows the witness to selectively take the
fifth amendment when the questions go only to his or her credibility. After providing for the use of specific instances of conduct to attack or support the witness'
character for truthfulness, Rule 608 states, "[t]he giving of testimony, whether by
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who confesses on the stand 12to5 wrongdoing cannot subsequently refuse to elaborate.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the government may compel a witness to answer questions
through a grant of immunity from future prosecution. If
the witness refuses, he may then be punished for contempt of court. 26 In theory, if not in practice, his fifth
amendment rights have been supplanted by the
equivalent protection of immunity from future prosecution. 27 For this reason, a grant of immunity is not elective. Unless offered to the witness as a part of a plea
bargain or some other official option, it cannot be remost often termed "imfused. 28 As a result, immunity1 is
29
"granted."
than
rather
posed"
Immunity may take either of two forms: use immunity
(i.e. "use and derivative" immunity) or transactional immunity. 3 0 The former protects the witness by barring the
3
use of his testimony in any future criminal prosecution.'1
In addition, in any subsequent criminal action, the burden
is on the government to show that any evidence produced
is not derived from the immunized testimony. 3 2 Nothing
however, prevents the government from prosecuting the
an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's
or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to
matters which relate only to credibility." FED. R. EvID. 608.
125United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1111 (1985).
126 L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 30-31.
127 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (the protection

of the immunity statute is co-extensive with that of the fifth amendment). In practice however, there may be many
reasons for a witness' refusal to testify even under a grant of immunity. That is,
he may feel that criminal immunity does not afford him sufficient protection.
More specifically, he may fear civil liability, public disgrace, or loss of his employment. Alternatively, in a serious criminal matter, he may be endangered by incriminating other suspects. L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 31.
128 L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 30.

1- See, e.g., L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 109.

1- Id. at 30.
i" Id.
132 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 ([t]he prosecution has an affirmative duty to prove
that the evidence is "derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony."); Annual Review, supra note 92, at 1025-26.
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witness for offenses about which he testified if it can obtain sufficient evidence independently of the immunized
testimony.'"3
Transactional immunity is significantly broader as it
provides the witness with protection from prosecution for
any offense about which he testifies." 4 It ensures that, at
least within the jurisdiction in which he testifies, no prosecution will arise from any "transaction" about which the
witness testifies.' 35 This is true regardless of the amount
of evidence obtained by the government independently of
immunity is currently found
the testimony. This form of
3 6
in many state jurisdictions.
In the federal system, witness immunity is governed by
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.' 7 It provides
specific procedures for the granting of use and derivative
immunity to witnesses testifying before federal courts and
grand juries.13 8 This act also provides for the grant of imL. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 30.
Id.

"
"
ISO

Id at 30, 75-78.
Id. at 30.

18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). The statute provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to (1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two
Houses, or a committee or subcommittee of either House, and the
person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in
any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Id. Thus, the statute creates use and derivative use immunity and provides for
unrestricted application to any federal offense. L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 36.
See also Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462 (upholding the constitutionality of § 6002).
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1988). This section provides:
"
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to
testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United
States, the United States district court for the judicial district in
137
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munity in proceedings before administrative or legislative
5 9
bodies.
In both contexts, the government's power to compel
testimony through immunity is subject to serious conwhich the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United
States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual
to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to
give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an order
under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment (1) the testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide information on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination.
Id.
'9

18 U.S.C. §§ 6004-05 (1988). With regard to administrative proceedings,

§ 6004 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to
testify or provide other information at any proceeding before an
agency of the United States, the agency may, with the approval of
the Attorney General, issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) An agency of the United States may issue an order under subsection (a) of this section only if in its judgment (1) the testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide other information on the basis of his privilege against selfincrmination.
l As for proceedings before the legislature, § 6005 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to
testify or provide other information at any proceeding before either
House of Congress, or any committee, or any subcommittee of
either House, or any joint committee of the two Houses, a United
States district court shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of
this section, upon the request of a duly authorized representative of
the House of Congress or committee concerned, an order requiring
such individual to give testimony or provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
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straints.140 For example, a federal agency may impose immunity only after it has received approval from the
attorney general, determined that the information is "necessary to the public interest," and been confronted with a
refusal to testify based on the fifth amendment privilege
41
or with a witness who is likely to refuse to testify.
IV.

A.

CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDINGS

In General

Because the fifth amendment rights of criminal and civil
defendants differ, the classification of proceedings as
either criminal, civil, or "quasi-criminal" is the threshold
issue in assessing a defendant's refusal to testify.' 4 2 This
section examines the various lines of analysis utilized by
the courts in making that distinction. It identifies the
traditional hallmarks of criminal punishment and subse(b) Before issuing an order under subsection (a) of this section, a
United States district court shall find that (1) in the case of a proceeding before either House of Congress,
the request for such an order has been approved by an affirmative
vote of a majority of the members present of that House;
(2) in the case of a proceeding before a committee or subcommittee of either House of Congress or a joint committee of both
Houses, the request for such an order has been approved by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members of the full committee;
and
(3) ten or more days prior to the day on which the request for such
an order was made, the Attorney General was served with notice of
intention to request the order.
(c) Upon application of the Attorney General, the United States
district court shall defer the issuance of any order under subsection
(a) of this section for such period, not longer than twenty days from
the date of the request for such order, as the Attorney General may
specify.
Id.
14o L. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 109.
"
18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1988); L. TAYLOR,

supra note 116, at 109. Interestingly,
one commentator has suggested that in light of these facts, a witness seeking a
valid grant of immunity might be well advised to refuse to answer incriminating
questions, specifically citing the fifth amendment privilege. He should also insist
upon being subpoenaed to testify or produce records in order to strengthen his
later argument that any incriminating testimony was compelled. Id. at 109-10.
"4 See, e.g., Roach v. NTSB, 804 F.2d 1147 (10th cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1006 (1988).
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quently, addresses the unique doctrine of the "quasicriminal" sanction.
B.

"Criminal" Sanctions

The distinction between civil and criminal sanctions has
attracted a great deal of scrutiny and scholarship for many
years. Courts and commentators alike have proposed various objective criteria and standards for making this determination. As previously noted, for example, Justice
Holmes suggested that the essence of criminal punishment is the punitive or vengeful motive of the inflictor. 43
While the distinction continues to attract attention, courts
generally agree that all laws serving primarily to punish
are criminal in nature. 4 4 Furthermore, the punitive nature of a given sanction is largely a question of statutory
interpretation.145 This analysis, in turn, focuses chiefly on
legislative history, and any express or implied legislative
46
intent is treated with great deference.
In 1980, the Supreme Court adopted this approach in
United States v. Ward, holding that the civil penalty provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 47 did
not constitute punitive sanctions.' 4 The Court enunciated a two-step test for distinguishing criminal and civil
sanctions in this decision. The first step, the Court stated,
is to determine any congressional preference for one form
of action over the other. Second, if Congress indicated
such a preference, it is presumed to have been enacted,
and the Court need only inquire as to whether the statute
is "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate...
49
[Congress'] intention."
143 0.

HOLMES, supra note 14, at 3.
See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965);
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 63344

34 (1886). See generally Clark, Civil and CriminalPenalties and Forfeitures:A Framework
for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 385-86 (1976).
145 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S 242, 248 (1980).
146
147
148
1,'

Charney, supra note 17, at 492-94.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1988).

Ward, 448 U.S. at 250-51.
Id. at 248-49.
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In seeking out congressional intent, the Ward Court and
subsequent courts have taken particular note of the structure of the statute and its procedural enforcement mechanisms. For example, they have inquired as to whether the
statute delineates "civil" and "criminal" penalties in separate sections. 50 In addition, the Court has monitored
whether the proceedings were in rem or in personam,
whether summary administrative proceedings were authe scope and aims of the penalties and
thorized, and
5
sanctions. ' '
With regard to the second prong of the inquiry, the
Court has traditionally performed a broad examination of
various historical, social and structural considerations. In
the landmark case of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 1 52 the
court inquired whether the sanction provided for an affirmative disability or restraint, required a finding of scienter, or promoted the traditionally punitive goals of
deterrence and retribution. 5 3 The Court also considered
the sanction's historical treatment, whether the conduct
to which it applies is already a crime, and whether54 it is
excessive in relation to its ostensibly civil purpose.
Another frequently cited characteristic of the criminal
sanction is the sense of concurrent "moral condemnation."' 55 The Court has in many instances recognized
that "what distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction
...
is the judgment of community condemnation which
accompanies and justifies its imposition."'' 56 The view is
1-0 Id. at 249; see also United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689
F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Aponte v. United States, 465 U.S.
1099 (1984).
'1
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984).
See infra notes 239-243 and accompanying text.
15-2 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

-5 Id. at 168-69.

- Id. Significantly, the Court noted that this list is not exhaustive or dispositive. For example, the revocation of a privilege freely granted is normally not
punitive or criminal. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). For a more complete discussion of the Kennedy factors, see Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive
Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241 (1985).
155

Charney, supra note 17, at 496-500.

IS

See, e.g., Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,404
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premised on the position that people associate the commission of intentional wrongful acts with criminal proceedings. More specifically, its proponents argue that the
stigma attached to a criminal conviction communicates a
message of moral condemnation, degrading the offender's social status, and essentially exiling him from the
community.157 Civil proceedings, on the other hand, do
not typically carry such stigma. No criminal record is established and, theoretically at least, people are less likely
to associate serious intentional offenses with the imposition of remedial sanctions. 58
Similarly, sanctions that serve a primarily compensatory
function are more frequently viewed as remedial rather
than criminal.' 59 In this view, if the sanction is authorized
in order to compensate for damages or loss, it is not criminal, but if suit can be brought to punish the defendant,
the sanction is criminal. 60 The classic example of this
reasoning is the contrast drawn between tort law and
criminal law. Specifically, in this view, the function of the
criminal law is to protect the public from harm through
punishment. Tort law, on the other hand, seeks to compensate a person for injuries. Similarly, the state brings
(1958). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967)(holding that stigma attached to
conviction of juvenile defendant entitled him to the procedural protections normally afforded adult criminal defendant); Clark, supra note 144, at 406-07.
,57 Griffiths, Ideology in CriminalProcedure, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 385-86 (1970).
'- Clark, supra note 144, at 407. Professor Clark states succinctly that "most
people see in civil penalties an element of deterrence, but not a very strong element of retribution or moral condemnation." Id.
-5 See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 242. In Ward, the Court relied heavily on the fact
that the penalties in question were very analogous to traditional civil damages.
Specifically, the Court observed that the penalties involved were imposed for
water pollution, and that they bore a correlation to the damages sustained by society and to the cost of enforcing the law. Id. at 254.
-6 Charney, supra note 17, at 497; W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, CRIMINAL LAW
(1972). This position has also received some support from case law. In an 1832
action, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated that the basic purpose for the
civil proceeding is remedial because the action is brought by an injured party
seeking compensation for a wrong inflicted upon him. Reed v. Northfield, 30
Mass. (13 Pick.) 94, 100-01 (1832)("A11 damages for neglect or breach of duty
operate to a certain extent as punishment; but the distinction is that [the criminal
suit] is prosecuted for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner."). Id.
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criminal proceedings to protect the public, but they have
no compensatory function. A tort suit, by way of contrast,
is brought by the injured party himself, seeking to recover

damages. 161
Finally, courts have occasionally relied upon the position that criminal sanctions are reserved for offenses
against the authority of the state. Support for this position can be found as early as 1892 when the Supreme
Court stated that "[p]enal laws, strictly and properly, are
those imposing punishment for an offense committed
against the state."'' 62 More recently, in Morissette v. United
States,' 6" the Court defined criminal laws in terms of "offenses against [the state's] authority."' 64 The usefulness
of this particular standard is, however, severely limited by
its breadth. That is, while "offenses against the authority
of the state"' 165 surely includes all criminal acts, it also encompasses many actions that are clearly civil. The governments of most states, for example, have imposed an
implied warranty of merchantability through the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code. 6 6 Breach of
,6,W. LAFAVE & A. Scot-r, supra note 161, at 11. The fact that the state is the
plaintiff in criminal actions has also been considered as a factor in the determination. It is not, however, dispositive.
In United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1893), for example, the
court partially attributed the government's greater burden of proof in criminal
trials to the relative position of the parties in power, situation, and advantage. Id.
The usefulness of this theory is limited, however, by the fact that the same considerations of relative power are present in actions brought by the government to
enforce civil sanctions. Furthermore, it would preclude the classification of privately-brought criminal actions such as suits for punitive damages and the qui tam
action by an informer as criminal. Charney, supra note 17, at 505-06, 506 n. 152.
For an example of the qui tam action, see Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United
States Steel Corp., 324 F.Supp. 412 (D. Ala. 1971).
112Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892).
163342 U.S. 246 (1952).
- Id. at 256. Speaking of criminal prosecutions for "public welfare offenses,"
the Court stated that "[w]hile such offenses do not threaten the security of the
state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to
the social order ....
" Id. Significantly, the Court explicitly included violations of
traffic statutes and regulations in its discussion of such offenses. Id. at 254.
lab Charney, supra note 17, at 496
-oSee U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977).
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this warranty, therefore, could be construed as an offense
against the authority of the state. It is doubtful, however,
167
that many courts would consider it a criminal act.
C.

Quasi-CriminalProceedings
In addition to the extensive case law and commentary
discussing the indicia of the criminal sanction, the
Supreme Court has also enunciated the doctrine of the
"quasi-criminal" proceeding.16 8 In a long line of cases,
the Court has made clear that particular penalties,
although civil for all other purposes, are criminal with regard to the fifth amendment.' 6 9 Therefore, the "quasicriminal" defendant is entitled to the protection of the de70
fendant's fifth amendment privilege.
This view originated in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United
States.' 7 ' Therein, the United States instituted forfeiture

proceedings against fraudulently imported property.
During the course of pre-trial discovery, the government
subpoenaed from Boyd various books and records relating to the property. Boyd resisted the subpoena by invoking the fifth amendment and arguing that production
would incriminate him. The government answered that
the proceedings were not criminal and therefore, the de72
fendant's privilege did not apply.'
The Supreme Court held for Boyd. 73 In an opinion
that has been described as "unfortunate," 74 severely limited, 175 and "muddying the legal waters,"' 176 Justice BradCharney, supra note 17, at 496-97.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-34.
See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 251; United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-34.
170 Clark, supra note 144, at 418-19. The theoretical justifications for the view
that the fifth amendment privileges are broader than other constitutional safeguards are discussed infra, notes 181 - 187 and accompanying text.
30,

17

116 U.S. 616 (1886).

Id. at 617-18.
173 Id. at 638.
174 Clark, supra note 144, at 416.
175 Ward, 448 U.S. at 253; see also United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914)
(declining to classify forfeitures as criminal for constitutional purposes other than
the fifth amendment).
1
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ley announced the principle of the quasi-criminal
proceeding. He stated that certain proceedings, although
civil in form, are criminal for purposes of the fifth amendment.1'7 7 He reasoned that the offense underlying the
forfeiture was in fact a criminal act. Therefore, if an indictment had been presented against Boyd, he could have
been convicted and subjected to fines and imprisonment.
In the criminal proceeding, he would have been entitled
to the full gamut of constitutional protections. Therefore,
the court concluded, the protection of the fifth amendment must be extended to defendants in proceedings for
the infliction of "penalties and forfeitures."' 78 The Court
specifically rejected the notion that the government could
effectively dictate the rights of the defendant
by its elec79
tion of the form of the proceeding.
The Court has never developed a principled explanation of why identical sanctions should trigger certain
criminal constitutional safeguards but not others. 80 Simi176
177

Clark, supra note 144, at 414.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-34. Justice Bradley stated,
We are . . .clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the

purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of
offenses committed by him, though they be civil in form, are in their
nature criminal .... As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures

incurred by the commission of offences against the law, are of this
quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of
criminal proceedings ... and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....

Id.
178

Id. The court stated:
As therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature
we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for
purposes of ... that portion of the [f]ifth [a]mendment which declares that no man shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.

Id.
179Id. at 634. Rhetorically, Justice Bradley asked, "If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment and to file a civil information against the [defendant] . . .can he by this device take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and
deprive the [defendant] of [his] immunities as [a] citize[n]?" Id. Without hesitation, he answered, "This cannot be." Id.
-8Clark, supra note 144, at 414-20. Drawing on numerous decisions of the
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larly, it has never effectively explained or established the
precise parameters of the quasi-criminal doctrine.'' In
Helvering v. Mitchell,' 82 the Court suggested that certain
constitutional protections are simply "broader" than
others.' 8 3 This explanation, however, merely recognized
that the policy motivations behind the various safeguards
are different and that they therefore command different
treatment and application. As one scholar has noted, because the Court was "armed with its facile 'quasi-criminal'
label, [it] did not feel the need to explain what those prin184
ciples are and why they differ."'
Commentators have explained Boyd as a product of the
Court's intuitive feeling that the compulsion of testimony
in a forfeiture proceeding is, at a minimum, unfair, and at
its worst, unconstitutional.18 5 This notion is based not on
Supreme Court, Professor Clark has suggested that the Court's analysis is most
accurately explained as hinging on the punitive nature of the sanction rather than
the criminal-civil distinction. In his view, the Court's analysis can be reduced to
the principle that all criminal sanctions are necessarily punitive but not all punitive sanctions are criminal. Rather than considering the Boyd forfeiture proceedings as civil in form but punitive in nature and effect (i.e. quasi-criminal), Clark
would refer to it as punitive and non-criminal. Id.
In Clark's scheme, certain "broader" constitutional safeguards, including both
the defendant's and the witness' fifth amendment privileges, are available in all
cases involving punitive sanctions, whether they are civil or criminal in form.
Other protections, for example the double jeopardy clause, apply only if the proceedings are "criminal" and by definition, punitive. Thus, under Clark's interpretation, the Boyd forfeitures are not criminal and therefore not subject to all the
procedural safeguards of criminal due process; however, they are punitive.
Therefore, the defendant is entitled to the broader constitutional safeguards such
as the self-incrimination privilege. Id.
18, The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that proceedings are quasi-criminal
"when a central issue in a case is 'close to one of a criminal nature.' " Carson v. Polley,
689 F.2d 562, 575 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins.
Co., 672 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1982))(emphasis added).
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
303 U.S. at 400 n.3 (quoting Regan, 232 U.S. at 50).
' Clark, supra note 144, at 419. Professor Clark also suggests that "[plerhaps
the chief gain from removing the 'quasi-criminal' rationale would be to force the
Court to elaborate the rationale that is, in fact, its ground for decision." Id. at
419-20.
185 Id., at 414-20. Professor Clark also rejects two alternative explanations as
unsatisfactory. First, he dismisses the notion that the court viewed the case as an
instance of the government using the threat of forfeiture to coerce Boyd to disclose testimony that could be used against him in a later criminal trial. He further
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the criminal nature of the proceeding but on its punitive
effect. That is, while the consequences of a noncriminal
punitive proceeding are not the traditional criminal sanctions of imprisonment or pillory, the state is nonetheless
seeking retribution for a legal transgression. As a result,
the proceedings raise many of the same concerns that underlie the application of the self-incrimination clause in
criminal proceedings. They evoke, for example, concern
testimony
that oppressive tactics will be used to secure
86
and that such testimony will be unreliable.
V.

A.

APPLICATION TO AIR LAW CASES

Refusal of Fifth Amendment Privileges

In applying these tenets to pilot disciplinary proceedings, courts have shown a reluctance to extend the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination to airmen. They have refused to classify the
These
proceedings as criminal or quasi-criminal. 87
courts conclude that, in establishing pilot disciplinary
sanctions, the legislature intended a civil penalty, and that
certificate actions are not "sufficiently punitive in their nature and effect" to overcome this congressional preference. 8 Moreover, at least one court has refused to
observes that the Court has held that incriminating testimony may not be coerced
by the threatened revocation of a professional license. Id.; see, e.g., Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). He also rejects the view that the case was decided on
lack of probable cause grounds. Such explanations, he concludes, do not reflect
the true spirit of the opinion. Furthermore, the Boyd court does not advert to
either future criminal prosecutions or lack of probable cause. Clark, supra note
144, at 414-17.
1- Clark, supra note 144, at 417. Similarly, denial of the privilege in noncriminal punitive proceedings offends the basic notion that alternative, less intrusive
means should be preferred, and it threatens the adversarial nature of the adjudicatory process. Id.
,87See, e.g., Air East, Inc. v. NTSB, 512 F.2d 1227, 1234 n.17 (3d Cir. 1975).
The court noted in passing that "[t]here is a difference of opinion as to whether
the enforcement proceedings are intended to be remedial or punitive in nature."
Id. (citing Sabinske v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 346 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1965); Nadiak
v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962); Pangburn v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962)).
' See, e.g., Nadiak, 305 F.2d at 590 n. 1. In Nadiak, the court took the position
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extend the witness' privilege to a pilot in a decertification
action. 8 9
B.

Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board
In Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board,'9 0 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected a pilot's attempt to invoke his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in a license suspension
proceeding.' 9 ' Roach, president of Roach Aircraft Company of Colorado, had compiled over 20,000 hours of
flight time, and had never been previously cited for violation of any FAA regulations. In November, 1980, Roach
and an assistant flew a Piper Aerostar 601P from Denver
to Lajunta, Colorado to demonstrate the plane for potential buyers. After the demonstration, Roach and his assistant left LaJunta airport for the return to Denver. Before
leaving the immediate vicinity of the airport for the return
to Denver, Roach made three passes over the runway at
an altitude of approximately 500 feet to allow his customers to see the plane in flight. At the end of the third pass
he executed a 360 degree aileron roll. 92
After a preliminary investigation by the FAA, officials
alleged that Roach had violated Section 91.79(c) 93 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations prohibiting the operation of
an aircraft less than 500 feet above the ground and within
500 feet of surface structures; Section 91.31 (a) ' prohibiting the operation of an aircraft without compliance with
its operating limitations; Section 91.15(c) 95 proscribing
the intentional execution of a maneuver exceeding a bank
of 60 degrees relative to the horizon unless all nonthat "it is public safety, and not punishment, which undergirds the whole statutory
scheme." Id.
- Roach v. NTSB, 804 F.2d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 486 U.S.
1006 (1988).
19 Id. at 1147.
'9'

Id. at 1155.

Id. at 1149.
Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(c) (1990).
14 C.F.R. § 91.31(a).
19514 C.F.R. § 91.15(c)(1).
'
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crewmembers aboard the aircraft are wearing parachutes;
and Section 91.9196 prohibiting the operation of an aircraft in a reckless manner so as to endanger the life or
97
property of another.
The investigators recommended a civil fine of $500.
The Administrator, however, issued a Notice of Proposed
Certificate Action, calling for the suspension of Roach's
commercial license for 120 days. Roach and his attorney
met with the Administrator in an informal conference and
succeeded in having the suspension reduced to 60 days.
The order of suspension subsequently found Roach guilty
of all four alleged violations. 98
On motion by Roach, an ALJ conducted a de novo review.'" During the proceedings, the ALJ allowed the Administrator to call Roach as an adverse witness. Roach
objected, arguing that he was entitled to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The ALJ overruled the objection, and on examination, Roach admitted
that he had executed the aileron roll and that he and his
assistant were not wearing parachutes at the time. He
also admitted that the Aerostar's operating instructions
did not authorize such acrobatic maneuvers. 2 °° Based on
this testimony and the record of the proceedings below,
the ALJ found that Roach violated the operating instructions of the plane; that he operated the craft in a reckless
manner; and that he executed a maneuver exceeding 60
degrees while his non-crewmembers were not wearing
parachutes.20 ' In light of Roach's long history in aviation,
however, the ALJ reduced the suspension to 30 days. 2
The NTSB affirmed this judgment, and Roach appealed
20 3
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for relief.
1 14 C.F.R. § 91.9.
"97 Roach, 804 F.2d at 1150.
ago Id.
'99

Id.

-o Id. at 1152.
2M

Id.
Id.

203

Id

201
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The appeals court upheld the suspension.2° Moreover,
the court specifically rejected Roach's fifth amendment
claims, holding that the defendant's privilege was inapplicable because the proceedings were neither criminal nor
"quasi-criminal." As for the witness' privilege, the court
found that Roach made no attempt to invoke it,2 0 5 and

that in any event, Roach presented no evidence on which
the court could find that his testimony presented any reasonable apprehension of future criminal prosecution. °6
In concluding that the sanctions were not criminal, the
court looked first to legislative intent and the statutory
construction test. It found that Congress did not intend
certificate actions to be punitive and that therefore, they
were not criminal. The court noted that the Act provided
for the imposition of criminal penalties in a separate section and that that section expressly excluded violations of
the safety regulations at issue.20 7
The court conceded that the sanction furthered the traditionally criminal goals of retribution and deterrence;
- Id at 1160-61.
-0 Roach, 804 F.2d at 1152. The court noted that Roach's only attempt at invoking the self-incrimination privilege was his objection to being called to the
stand and that thereafter he cooperated by answering all questions. Id Such a
one-time objection, the court held, can only be interpreted as an attempt to invoke the defendant's right. To hold otherwise would "deny to the judge the specifics needed to determine the privilege's applicability to each question, as well as
a record on which appellate courts could review that determination." Id. at 1152
n. 5. Therefore, it is insufficient to invoke the witness' privilege. Instead, the
witness must object to each potentially incriminating question as it is asked. Id.
20- Id at 1152 n.5. The court did note, however, that "some [s]tates have made
reckless operation of an aircraft a crime," and that in fact, one of those states is
Colorado. The court held, however, that Roach "presented no facts as to whether
such prosecution is likely or even possible on the basis of the statements he made
at the hearing." lI Interestingly, the court did not cite the Hoffman holding that a
fifth amendment claim is invalid only when it is "perfectly clear.., that the answer[s] cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate." See United States v.
Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 479, 486 (1951).
207 Roach, 804 F.2d at 1153. 49 U.S.C. § 1472 provides criminal penalties for
individuals "knowingly and willingly violating any of the provisions of this chapter
(except for subchapters III, V, VI, and XII) ... for which no penalty is otherwise
provided in the section or subsection 1474 of this title." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(a)
(1988). The statute further provides that violators shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to a fine of up to $500 for a first offense and $2,000 for
subsequent convictions. Id.
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however, it gave this factor little weight. It noted that the
sanction was a public safety measure and that the deterrent and retributive effect of the suspension was similar to
the impact of other civil sanctions. A certain amount of
retribution and deterrence, the court noted, is found in
most civil penalties. Therefore, the court held, this factor
cannot be dispositive. The court concluded that in view
of these various factors, the suspension did not serve a
"clearly penal purpose or effect" and that "Roach did not
need to be afforded the protections given a defendant in a
20 8
criminal trial at his hearing.
Furthermore, the court refused to find the effect of the
sanction so punitive as to negate the intent of the legislature. Specifically, the court noted that the action was not
an affirmative restraint but only the "revocation of a privilege conditioned on compliance with the safety regulations of the FAA."' 20 9 Similarly, the court focused on the
fact that the safety regulations in question did not require
a finding of scienter, and it concluded that the sanction
was not excessive in relation to its public safety
objective.21 °

VI.

THE CASE FOR THE EXTENSION OF FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES TO PILOTS FACING
DECERTIFICATION

A.

Introduction

While the reasoning of the Roach court is typical of the
approach taken by courts throughout the country, it is not
the exclusive view. In fact, there is a difference of opinion
over whether the enforcement provisions of the Act are
remedial or punitive in their nature.21 ' In addition, commentators have not been reluctant to question the distinction between criminal and civil sanctions in general.21 2
- Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154.
-o Id. at 1153-54.
210
211

2

Id. at 1154.
Air East, Inc. v. NTSB, 512 F.2d 1227, 1234 n.17 (3d Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 144, at 379; Charney, supra note 17, at 478; Note,
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The following discussion draws from the decisions of
other courts and focuses on the arguments raised by the
commentators in favor of granting fifth amendment privileges to pilots facing delicensure proceedings.
B.

Decertification Is a Criminal Sanction

1.

The Traditional View

Confining the discussion to the traditional framework
of analysis, the strongest argument in favor of extending
the self-incrimination privilege in certificate actions is that
decertification and suspension are often purely punitive
sanctions. For example, the FAA has fought vigorously in
defense of its power to impose suspensions unrelated to
any technical deficiency or incompetence on the part of
the pilot.2 13 In upholding the FAA's position, courts have
explicitly noted that such sanctions are for purely "disciplinary purposes. "214
Because all punitive sanctions are criminal, it follows
that the fifth amendment should be available in such
cases.
In Pangburn v Civil Aeronautics Board 215 the First Circuit
considered this issue in the context of a 90 day suspension
order. The investigation surrounded the crash of a plane
piloted by Pangburn at New York's La Guardia Airport on
September 14, 1960. At the informal hearing, Pangburn
contended that the accident was not a result of pilot negligence but of an unforeseeable downdraft, or "thermal
sink," which caused the plane to descend abruptly. The
Administrator rejected this position, concluding that
Pangburn had failed to exercise appropriate care, skill,
judgment, and responsibility, and suspended his commerPunishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separationof Powers and Substantive Constitutional
Restrictions and its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez and Speiser Cases, 34 IND. LJ. 231
(1959); Note, Statutory Penalties - A Legal Hybrid, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1938).
21-1 See, e.g., Go Leasing, Inc. v. NTSB, 800 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1986);
Pangburn v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 311 F.2d 349, 354-55 (1st Cir. 1962).
214 Go Leasing, 800 F.2d at 1519.
21.311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962).
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cial pilot's license for 90 days.21 6 The NTSB affirmed the
order, and Pangburn appealed to the federal court.21
In affirming the order of suspension, the court noted
that the suspension bore no relation to the qualification of
the pilot. The court specifically held that the government
may order suspension for disciplinary purposes as a sanction against reckless conduct because of its deterrent
value to both the offender and others similarly situated. 8
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that its review
of the legislative history of the Act revealed no congressional intention to place any limits on the circumstances
under which the government may impose such suspensions. The court also held that because the purpose of
the Act is to promote public safety in air transport and air
commerce, it would be illogical to limit the power of sus-

pension to cases of pilot incompetence. 1 9
Moreover, the sanction's concurrent impact on public
safety should not disguise its primarily punitive nature.
In such circumstances, the courts must ascertain the
"dominant purpose" of the sanction.2 2 0 The essence of
punishment, for example, is a dominant purpose of retribution and deterrence.2 2' It inflicts hurt on a violator for
no reason other than revenge or the desire to influence
his future conduct. 2 2 Suspensions and revocations unrelated to technical proficiency are therefore essentially punitive. They are intended to deter the pilot from future
216
217

218

Id at 351.

Id.
Id. at 354.

219 Id. at 352-55.

- Clark, supra note 144, at 435-36. Professor Clark suggests that the court may
attempt to discern such a purpose either through an inquiry into legislative history or a rebuttable presumption based on the effects of a given sanction. He
adopts the latter approach, calling it a "search for purpose pure and simple," and
rejects the idea of a dominant purpose altogether. Id. at 436. He concludes that
such a dominant purpose inquiry is merely an inaccurate attempt to discern the
"purpose that was uppermost or dominant in the group psyche of the legislature
at the time the statute was enacted." Id.
22,

H.

HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

ITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
222

4-5 (1968); H.

PACKER, THE LIM-

31 (1968).

H. HART, supra note 221, at 4-5; H.

PACKER,

supra note 221, at 31.

1991]

COMMENTS

333

transgressions and to punish him for past offenses. 2
Logically, any conclusion in this regard must remain
flexible to the extent it excludes the secondary effects of a
given sanction. Inevitably, every sanction entails some indirect impact. For instance, incarceration is a clear example of pure punishment. It inflicts injury on lawbreakers
as revenge and deters them and others from performing
similar actions in the future. It also, however, performs
an important public protection function by disabling the
offender from harming the public in the future. In this
view, the sanction's primary objective is punishment, yet it
contains the strong remedial element of public
protection.
A much more difficult analysis is presented by sanctions
whose ostensible purpose is regulation and public
safety. 24 A context closely analogous to the FAA proceedings, for example, is the driver's license suspension
of an individual convicted of negligent driving.2 25 This
sanction serves both to deter future offenses and to punish and incapacitate the offender. Its primary purpose is
regulatory, the protection of the public from dangerous
drivers; however, it also provides a strong measure of retribution and deterrence. Because it effectuates a significant punitive end, the sanction is punitive unless there
exists an alternative purpose rationally related to a legitimate end.226 Furthermore, if punishment is a sanction's
2*3 Clark, supra note 144, at 385. Professor Clark postulates that punitive sanctions seek retribution and/or deterrence. He analogizes the search for a dominant purpose in this context to that for a dominant purpose to "discriminate
invidiously" under the equal protection clause or the first amendment. Id. If the
law places special burdens on a group of persons who have violated some legal
prohibition, he concludes, there should be a presumption that the sanction is punitive unless there is convincing evidence of some alternative purpose. Id. See
infra notes 288 - 293 and accompanying text.
-4
Clark, supra note 144, at 475-89. Professor Clark notes that this is perhaps
the most difficult context in which to attempt the punitive/non-punitive distinction. Id at 475.
- Id. at 482-83.
226 Grass, supra note 155, at 297. For an example of an extreme case in which
the court strained to find such a rational relationship, see Skinner v. State, 115
P.2d 123 (Okla. 1941), rev'don other grounds, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In that case, the
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primary goal, no assertion of an alternative purpose or
corresponding relationship will alter the sanction's essentially penal nature. 227 "Retribution and deterrence," the
Supreme Court has stated, "are not legitimate, nonpunitive governmental objectives. 228
One argument proffered in support of the view that license suspension is not a punitive sanction is that licenses
are denied to all persons who are unfit to drive.229 Persons convicted of negligent driving, therefore, constitute
only a subclass of all those who are unfit. Therefore, the
sanction is not limited to persons convicted of forbidden
acts and is not punitive in its application. 230 This view,
however, depends heavily on the ability of the legislature
to establish a rational causal link between the accident or
incident at issue and a proclivity for accidents in general. 231 Absent evidence that suspension will reduce this
dangerous tendency when the driver returns to the road,
the restoration of the license belies any ostensible desire
to prevent harm. In fact, it suggests a punitive purpose. 32 Any improvement in driving skills attributed to
the suspension period in actuality results from an increased fear of future suspension. This improvement
then, is a clear result of deterrence and hence,
punishment. 3
Pilot decertification may be similarly analyzed. The
court held that state imposed sterilization of habitual offenders was not a punitive
sanction because it was intended as "a eugenic measure to improve the safety and
general welfare of the race by preventing from being born persons who will probably become criminals." Id at 126 (emphasis added). In fairness to the Oklahoma
court, subsequent commentators have noted that there was a disagreement
among scientists at this time regarding whether criminality was an hereditary feature. G. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 754 (1986). See aho W. HEALY, THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT 188-89 (1915)(criminality is closely related to inherited
features); D. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALITY 90 (4th ed. 1947)(no such
thing as a born criminal).
227 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979).
228 Id.
2- Clark, supra note 144, at 482.
230 Id.
23,

Id.

232

Id.
Id at 483.

233

1991]

COMMENTS

335

sanction's primary impact in such circumstances is as a
punitive, disciplinary penalty intended to punish the offending pilot. The sanction performs an important regulatory role in protecting the public safety, but that role is
clearly secondary. For example, a remedial sanction is
"imposed until such time as the offending carrier or air
agency has cured its defective equipment, procedures, or
23 4
staffing to such an extent as to assure safe operations.
There is no evidence, however, that previously suspended
pilots are less likely to be reckless or negligent in future
operations. Any such likelihood can be attributed primarily to the deterrent effect of the previous suspension. The
FAA and the courts have openly admitted that many certificate actions are unrelated to the pilot's qualifications
and undertaken only to punish transgressions.2 3 5 This is
not a "legitimate, nonpunitive governmental objective." ' 23 6 Therefore, the suspension of a pilot's certificate
is punitive despite its concurrent impact on public safety.
At least one federal judge has already reached this conclusion, stating that a complaint alleging that the pilot was
"careless" and ought therefore to be suspended without
'23 7
regard to his qualifications was "purely punitive.
In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms23 8 however, the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar
argument in a non-air law context. In that case, the defendant faced charges of dealing in firearms without a license. The district court acquitted him, and the
government instituted forfeiture proceedings against the
firearms. The district court granted forfeiture, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the forfeiture proceeding was criminal in nature and therefore barred by
234 Go Leasing, 800 F.2d at 1519; see also Pike v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 303 F.2d
353, 358 (8th Cir. 1962) (revocation of a pilot's license on grounds that the defendant was not qualified is "primarily remedial").
23- See, e.g., Go Leasing, 800 F.2d at 1519.
236 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20.
237 Lee v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 225 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Prettyman,

J., dissenting).
2--

465 U.S. 354 (1984).
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the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. In an
opinion by the ChiefJustice, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the forfeiture proceedings were remedial and
civil in nature. 9
Applying the Ward tests, the Court specifically relied on
the fact that the statute in question "furthers broad remedial aims. '24 ° In enacting the statute, the Court noted,
Congress was concerned with the widespread traffic and
availability of firearms and intended to limit the number
of firearms in the hands of those "whose possession
thereof was contrary to the public interest."'24' Thus, the
statute's primary role was remedial, controlling the
proliferation of firearms. "Keeping potentially dangerous
weapons out of the hands of unlicensed dealers," the
Court concluded, "is a goal plainly more remedial than
242
punitive.
The 89 Firearms case, however, is distinguishable from
pilot disciplinary proceedings. First, the 89 Firearms case
was plainly in rem rather than in personam.2 43 Cases directed against property rather than individuals are traditionally considered civil on the theory that the property
itself is the offender rather than the individual. 44 By contrast, there is no question but that the pilot is the subject
of the delicensure sanction. The cases would be analogous only if, for example, the FAA sought the forfeiture of
the plane.
Furthermore, conceding for the moment that the essence of the punitive sanction is a punitive legislative intent, 245 the courts' reliance on legislative history as an
Id. at 366.
Id. at 364.
241 Id. (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974)).
242 Id.
24., I.R.C. § 7323 (1988).
Section 7323 provides that an action to enforce a forfeiture "shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem in the United States District
Court for the district where such seizure is made." Id.; see also 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. at 363.
244 Id.; see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684
(1974); Comment, Forfeitures- Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 191, 192 (1970).
245 Clark, supra note 144, at 437. Clark also notes that this notion of punish239
240
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indicator of intent is inappropriate.24 6
In fact, the
Supreme Court has expressly rejected this line of analysis
in all other contexts.24 7 Moreover, one commentator has
termed it a "gross abdication of the judicial role,12 48 and,
in the words of another scholar, a "decision based on leg2 49
islative labels can hardly be termed 'judicial review.
The criticism of this approach focuses on several issues. 5 °
First of all, it is unlikely that there ever exists a consensus
in Congress for the passage of an act. 2 5 ' The legislature
has no independent consciousness, existing only as an aggregate of individuals. Each legislator supports every bill
for his own political and personal reasons. 52 Additionally, a legislator may entertain more than one reason for
supporting a bill, and in any event, the executive's motives in signing a bill into law may reflect intentions and
ment is consistent with the common sense perception. "[W]e sense a sharp difference," he notes, in "being shoved in anger and being shoved out of the way of an
oncoming truck." Id. (citing 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 7 (1881)). It is the
sincerity or animus of the actor to which we react. Where, as is often the case in
pilot disciplinary proceedings, there are alternative purposes to the "shove," people become ambivalent, and attempt to determine the other person's "true intent." Thus, under this view, whether a sanction is punitive depends on the
motivation or dominant purpose of the party who inflicts the sanction. Id. at 438.
246 Id. at 438. It has been noted that in the arena of regulatory agencies such as
the FAA a great degree of judicial deference to the agency's intentions is appropriate; however, even this commentator is quick to add that "[u]nquestionably, a
regulation can be invalidated if it is unconstitutional... " Weaver, JudicialInterpretation of Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 686
(1984).
247 See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 584 ("[T]he Court may not point to the difficulty of
the task as a justification for confining the scope of the punishment concept so
narrowly that it effectively abdicates . . . the judicial responsibility to enforce the
guarantees of due process."); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
(1968)(refusing to speculate as to whether the intent of Congress in prohibiting
the burning of draft cards was to suppress freedom of speech); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)(noting that inquiries into legislative motives are
"hazardous" at best); see also Charney, supra note 17, at 492-94; Clark, supra note
144, at 384, 436-44.
248 Charney, supra note 17, at 494.
249 Note, Constitutional Law Expatriation of Draft Evaders, 37 TUL. L. REV. 831,
834 (1963); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958)(rejecting reliance on
congressional labels).
2
Clark, supra note 144, at 441-44.
251 Id. at 441.
252 Id.
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concerns wholly apart from those intended by the
legislature.25 3
Furthermore, assuming that a consensus could be determined as to purpose, the historical record is inherently
suspect.2 54 For instance, committee reports and floor debates are highly political. 255 They necessarily rely on the
words of only a few members of the legislature. Therefore, much legislative history is made by individual congressmen or small groups of individuals interested in
specific legislation rather than by Congress as a whole. 56
Furthermore, this degree of legislative intent may be beyond discovery with respect to state legislatures.257
There is also a certain degree of futility in striking down
a law based on an improper motive in the legislature.258
There is, presumably, nothing to prevent Congress from
passing the act a second time, while recording its proper
motives in the form of the floor debates and committee
reports to insulate it from annulment by the Court.259
Furthermore, to strike down a law on such ground would
be "to merely chasten legislative immorality ' 260 and to
demean the dignity of a coordinate branch by inquiring
into its motives.26 '
Thus, while on its face such an inquiry appears to be a
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 443.
255 Id.
256 Id.; see also Kohler, Judicial Interpretationof Enacted Law, 9 MOD. LEGAL PHIL.
SERIES 187 (1917)("Surely it would be a strange method of interpretation by
which the validity of a law depended on some parliamentarian's state of digestion."); Note, supra note 249, at 834 ("[Ijt is questionable whether the penal or
regulatory character of an act should turn on the color it acquires as a result of
congressional debate.").
257 Clark, supra note 144, at 441-42.
258 Id.; see, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)
("[T]here is an element of futility in ajudicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives
of its supporters.").
2-59 Clark, supra note 144, at 441-42; see also, Palmer, 403 U.S. at 217 (if a law is
struck down for a bad motive, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature repassed it for different reasons).
26
Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341,
360 (1949)
26, A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 215 (1962).
2
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concerted effort between the legislative and judicial
branches, it avoids the broader and more important issue
of whether the legislation has exceeded its constitutional
bounds. The Court should determine, independently of
Congress, when and to what extent constitutional protections are available to defendants. There is no need for
blind acceptance of a Congressional label. The Court itself has explicitly rejected such reasoning in other contexts. 2 62 In the arena of regulatory sanctions however, the

Court has insisted that only the "clearest proof" of punitive effect will suffice to override a perceived remedial intent in Congress.263
Moreover, while both 89 Firearms and the pilot disciplinary proceedings involve the forfeiture of property interests, the qualitative difference in the nature of those
interests distinguishes the cases. 26 Specifically, the, pilot's certificate rights have a broad social value, while the
illegal firearms are merely contraband. Unregistered fire262 Trap, 356 U.S. at 94 ("How simple would be the task of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of
the labels posted on themI")(exclamation in original).
26S See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 242, 249 (1980).
264 See Comment, supra note 244, at 191. By way of example, the author suggests that if an individual is apprehended in an automobile while transporting
heroin, the government will seize both the car and the drugs. Under this view, the
automobile is beneficial property, and the drugs are inherently dangerous.
Seizure of the drugs is clearly remedial and civil in nature. Seizure of the automobile, on the other hand is best characterized as punishment of the possessor for
the criminal act of transporting heroin. Therefore, in challenging the right of the
government to seize his automobile, the possessor should be entitled to the procedural safeguards of criminal due process. Id. at 195.
This position is also consistent with the view that the government should not be
allowed to seize the property of an individual and then demand that he prove
ownership by a preponderance of the evidence in order to get it back. While this
may be acceptable in the cases of inherently dangerous articles which the government seeks to remove from private control, it is deplorable with regard to such
beneficial property as automobiles and personalty. Such takings are punitive, directed at the defendant personally, and he is entitled to the safeguards of due
process. Specifically, the government should be under a higher standard of proof,
and there should be a conviction prior to any forfeiture. Id.
Logically, then, because the protection of the fifth amendment is "broader"
than that of the other constitutional guaranties, the defendant should be privileged from self incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37
(1914).
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arms are inherently dangerous and of only limited social
value. 65 The FAA proceedings are not in rem because
the property is not the offender. In fact, the pilot is the
offender and the sanctions are primarily intended to punish him for his transgression. Accordingly, they should be
considered punitive and by extension, criminal. Thus,
the defendant's fifth amendment privilege should be
available in FAA proceedings.
The purpose of the seizure should also be considered in
determining its nature for constitutional purposes.266
Generally, such sanctions can be justified on grounds of
protection, prevention, or punishment. The seizure in 89
Firearms may be characterized as a protective action.
Under this approach, any property the mere possession of
which presents an unreasonable risk to the public safety is
subject to forfeiture. 67 Because of the dangerous and undesirable nature of the property, the proceeding is in rem
and remedial.268 Consequently, the safeguards of criminal process are not required. 69
Under a prevention theory, the goal of the action is deterrence.2 70 The government believes that the seizure will
be more effective than any traditional criminal sanction,
and through forfeiture of property, it hopes to prevent future transgressions.2 7 To the extent that a seizure may
265 See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364; Clark, supra note 144, at 478.
Professor
Clark notes that the Court has long recognized "a category of property 'malum in
se' consisting of contraband whose possession by any private citizen is unlawful."
Id. at 478. As examples, he cites United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951)
(narcotics); United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971)
(counterfeit money); United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp. 613
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (unregistered sawed-off shotguns). Significantly, Clark proposes
that while the distinction between beneficial property and contraband is "logically
satisfying" in the attempt to classify property forfeitures as criminal or civil, there
are many cases where non-contraband was seized and the court refused to consider the sanction punitive. Id.

2-

Comment, supra note 244, at 192-95.

Id.
Id.
2See, e.g., 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974).
270 Comment, supra note 244, at 193.
271 Id.
267
266
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be characterized as preventive, however, it is punitive with
respect to the person from whom the property is
seized.2 72 All the constitutional protections should therefore be available to that individual in defending his rights,
including the fifth amendment privilege.2
Similarly, if the property rights were seized under a
punishment theory, the government straightforwardly imposes punishment on the transgressor for his past offense.274 The sanction is clearly punitive and therefore
criminal for constitutional purposes. Again, all the constitutional protections should be extended to the
defendant.
Pilot decertification, because of its in personam nature
and the beneficial nature of the property, is most appropriately viewed as prevention or punishment. The property itself is not dangerous or offensive. Moreover, the
government is openly seeking to punish the offender and
deter others from following his example. Under either
characterization, the proceeding is punitive and the pilot
should not be forced to incriminate himself.
It is also significant that pilot decertification serves no
compensatory function. In the traditional view, if the action can be brought to compensate the victim for damages, it is civil. Alternatively, if the action is brought to
punish the defendant, the sanction is criminal. 276 Succinctly stated, "a suit can be viewed as compensatory only
if property is transmitted to an identifiable individual or
group of individuals and the value of that property is actually determined by estimating the value of the interests
lost by the recipient as a result of the actions of the defendant. ' 277 In contrast to the Ward penalties which were
used to finance pollution control and reclamation pro272
273
274

275
276
277

Id.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
Comment, supra note 244, at 193.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
Charney, supra note 17, at 497.
Id. at 499.
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grams, 278 decertification produces no monetary gain.
Consequently, decertification is not analogous to traditional civil money damages. 7 9 Instead, it more closely resembles the Boyd forfeitures which had "absolutely no
correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the
cost of enforcing the law."128 ° Only in the broadest sense
can the sanction be said to perform a compensatory
role.2 8 ' In fact, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances
under which the state may be compensated for an infraction such as reckless flying through the revocation of a
pilot's certificate. Furthermore, if the Administrator truly
seeks compensation, he is free to pursue monetary sanctions rather than decertification.2 82
Alternatively, even purely compensatory sanctions must
be reasonably related to the injury suffered by the victim
in order to maintain their civil nature.2 83 The Ward court,
for example, noted that if a fine exceeds the amount
which would reasonably compensate the government, it
then becomes penal.2 8 4 Assuming that a monetary value
can be attached to the decertification sanction, the figure
would bear no rational relation to the damage caused by
the pilot.28 5 In light of this discussion, FAA certificate actions such as that faced by Roach clearly satisfy the Ward
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(f), (k), (1) (1988).
Cf One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972)(forfeiture aided in enforcement of tariff regulations by providing a
"reasonable form of liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions
and serv[ing] to reimburse the government for investigation and enforcement
expenses.").
280 Ward, 448 U.S. at 254.
281 See, e.g., People v. Briggs, 114 N.Y. 56, 65, 20 N.E. 820, 823 (1889)(holding
that $500 fine imposed for violation of a deceptive trade statute was not criminal
because it sought "indemnity [for] the public for the injury suffered by reason of
the violation.").
2H2 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(1); Go Leasing, 800 F.2d at
1518.
283 See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 1194.
284 Id.
2.5 Cf Charney, supra note 17, at 499, 499 n. 122. Professor Charney states that
if, for example, the United States suffered a total loss of $1 billion due to water
pollution in a single year and there are 100,000 convicted polluters, a reasonably
compensatory sanction might be $10,000 each, regardless of the extent of the
individual's pollution. Id. There is no rational method available to make an
278

279
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Court's inquiry. Despite the difficulties of applying objective criteria to determine the penal or regulatory nature of a sanction, the Court's reliance on legislative
history is misplaced. Such legislative history is unreliable
and elevates the congressional "labelling power" over the
constitutional limits of Congress' authority. While judicial deference is admirable in many contexts, such deference should not come at the expense of the Constitution
or the accused.
Further, even in the event that the Court concludes that
Congress intended the sanction to be regulatory, its purpose and effect are clearly punitive in nature. Despite the
fact that the Act stocks the FAA enforcement procedures
with various indicia of civil penalties,2 86 many certificate
actions are totally unrelated to any technical deficiency
and instead are used by the FAA to discipline pilots. Any
regulatory effect flows from the deterrence created by
previous punitive suspensions. Finally, in contrast to typical regulatory penalties, decertification serves no compensatory purpose.
2.

Alternatives to the Traditional View

Many commentators have directly challenged the traditional distinction between civil and criminal sanctions and
have, in turn, proposed alternate standards for making
the determination. Professor J. Morris Clark, for example, suggests that the courts presume that a sanction is
punitive if it exhibits certain appropriate indicia of punishment. 28 7 This view disregards legislative intent, noting
that such reliance leads to "contradictory and disparate
results. 2' 18 Instead, the approach examines whether the
law places special burdens on a group of persons who
analogous calculation regarding either damages inflicted by offending pilots or
the loss to the government.
286 See Roach v. NTSB, 804 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1986). See supra, notes

196-208 and accompanying text.
287

Clark, supra note 144, at 385. Clark, an Associate Professor of Law at the

University of Minnesota, proposed the approach in 1976. See id. at 379, 385.
2-

Id. at 385.
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have violated some legal prohibition. If so, it presumes
that the law is punitive, absent convincing evidence to the
contrary. Throughout this final phase of the analysis, the
courts should focus on factors such as whether the statute
has an alternative purpose, the extent of its over- or
under-breadth with regard to those ends, and the availability of less burdensome alternatives. 89
By way of illustration, delicensure of attorneys and
other professionals may be considered criminal under this
standard. The issue centers largely upon a finding of a
valid regulatory purpose for the sanction. In support of
such an alternative function, Clark submits that members
of the class penalized are more likely than others to be
untrustworthy in the future. Alternatively, even if no statistical correlation can be produced, the public at large
will still draw this conclusion and refuse to place their
trust in these individuals. Under this latter view, the
delicensure is intended as a means of preserving the public trust in the profession.29 ° Similar to the suspension of
drivers' licenses,2 9 ' the government defends the sanction
by arguing that it does not single out lawbreakers for special burdens and that in any given instance, the offense for
which the sanction is imposed is but one of many various
indicia of unfitness for which the license may be revoked.
The critical question at this juncture is whether the offense at issue actually indicates such unfitness.29 2 If not,
the sanction is overbroad with regard to its regulatory
purpose.
The FAA decertification proceedings are closely analogous. Under the Clark scheme, the sanction is presumed
to be punitive if it places special burdens on lawbreakers.
Absent any statistical correlation between those pilots
who have been convicted, for example, of operating an
aircraft in a reckless manner, and the number of future
289

2-

Id.
Id. at 486.

-1 See supra notes 225 - 233 and accompanying text.
Id.
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accidents in which these pilots are involved, it is difficult
to conclude that decertification or suspension is not specifically directed at the offender. Moreover, given the fact
that the FAA and the courts concede that many such sanctions are totally unrelated to the pilot's technical qualifications, it is even more difficult to conclude that such a
conviction represents an indicia of unfitness. For this reason, the sanction is overbroad with regard to its ostensible
regulatory purpose and the presumption of its punitive
nature should not be defeated.
A second commentator has proposed another alternative standard. This view incorporates many of the elements already discussed in the various sections above.
Specifically, it focuses on the compensatory nature of the
typical civil damage award and the notion of the state as
plaintiff. It also credits, to a certain extent, the notions of
legislative purpose. In this view, an involuntary and uncompensated loss of life, liberty, or property must be
characterized as criminal if (1) the loss is authorized or
allowed by the government; (2) the procedure for quantifying the loss does not limit the loss to that which is required to compensate another for a previous wrong; (3)
the loss is inflicted not merely for the purpose of general
deterrence;29s and (4) the loss is determined on the basis
of retribution or is an unreasonable94or unnecessary incidental effect of government action.
-3 Charney, supra note 17, at 510. In Charney's scheme, the distinction between general and specific deterrence plays a large role in the ultimate determination of the essential nature of a sanction. A sanction serves a "specific" deterrent
function if it inflicts an injury on an individual or group of individuals as a result
of a previous transgression for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of that
transgression by that individual or group of individuals. If the loss is triggered by
the undesired conduct, the sanction is criminal. Id.
In contrast, if the sanction inflicts a loss on a person or group of persons in
order to control future conduct of all persons in the society without regard for
past actions of the group, it serves as a general deterrent. A gasoline purchase
tax, for example, aimed at reducing gasoline consumption, is a general deterrent.
In that case, the loss is inflicted merely to influence future conduct, without regard for any past actions, and the group affected is rationally related to the purpose sought. Therefore, the sanction is not criminal. Id.
- Charney, supra note 17, at 507-12.
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For instance, the ostensibly civil penalties mandated by
the Intercoastal Shipping Act295 are criminal under this
second approach. In this Act, the government has sanctioned the loss imposed, and the procedure for determining the amount of the penalty is largely unrestricted. 9 6
The apparent basis for the computation of the amount of
the fine is retribution or specific deterrence. The Act,
however, cannot serve as a general deterrent because it
addresses a past infraction. Finally, the government is not
exerting direct control over intercoastal shipping, but is
instead utilizing the incidental effects of such fines to encourage compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations. In light of this analysis the constitutional
protections guaranteed to criminal defendants must be
available. 9 7
FAA decertification proceedings may be similarly analyzed. The government sanctions the loss, and the extent
of the sanction is practically unlimited. It also addresses a
past transgression and serves as a specific deterrent. The
only legitimate basis for the determination of the extent
of the sanction is retribution and its prospective deterrent
value. Finally, the essence of the penalty is not direct control over air traffic but punishment of offending pilots.
The government relies on the incidental deterrent impact
of the certificate actions to encourage compliance with the
federal regulations and statutes. Consistent with the analysis above, certificate actions should therefore be considered criminal sanctions for constitutional purposes.
C. Decertification Is a "Quasi-Criminal" Sanction
Alternatively, decertification is, at a minimum, a "quasicriminal" proceeding in which fifth amendment protection should be available. Decertification, for example,
bears many of the hallmarks of traditional quasi-criminal
proceedings. As discussed extensively above, decertifica29

2297

46 U.S.C. §§ 814-15, 817, 831, 844 (1988).
Id. §§ 814-15, 817, 831, 844.
Charney, supra note 17, at 514-15.
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tion is frequently a purely punitive sanction. 298 This punitive nature is the very essence of the quasi-criminal
doctrine.2 99 Moreover, Boyd, by its own language, extends
the protections of the fifth amendment to all proceedings
for the infliction of "penalties and forfeitures" for offenses
against the law.3 °°
Significantly, analogous proceedings have been classified as quasi-criminal largely on the basis of their punitive
effect. In Illinois, for example, the violation of a traffic
regulation is a quasi-criminal offense.3 ° ' In Bootz v.
Childs,3 °2 an Illinois federal district court concluded that
the privilege against self-incrimination is available in proceedings to impose fines for the violation of traffic regulations. 0o In that case, Bootz was arrested and charged
with operating a bicycle after dark without lights and failing to stop at a stop sign. He brought suit against the
arresting officers and the city, alleging selective prosecution and infringement of his civil rights. At his deposition, he invoked the fifth amendment, refusing to
incriminate himself by stating "whether he committed the
bicycle violations." 304
Citing Rule 501,05 the court held that Bootz was enti- See supra notes 214 - 287 and accompanying text.
Clark, supra note 144, at 417.

29

500 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (emphasis added).
so, See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A para. 501 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
302 627 F.Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
303

Bootz, 627 F. Supp. at 101. See also Carson v. Polly, 689 F.2d 562, 576 (5th

Cir. 1982) (evidence in a civil damage suit, otherwise excludable under FED. R.
EVID. 404(a), is admissible because an assault and battery suit is "close to one of a
criminal nature." Other states have rejected this position. New York, for example, has classified traffic violations as civil offenses. People v. Amitrano, 59 Misc.
2d 471, 299 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (1st Dist. 1969) Significantly, even within that
jurisdiction, judges have expressed concern over excessive deference to the legislature in this arena. One dissenter argued that "simply because the legislature
chose to label these wrong-doings as 'traffic infractions' rather than 'crimes,' a
defendant's constitutional rights should not be made to disappear." Amitrano, 299
N.Y.S.2d at 278 (quoting People v. Letterio, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 374, 213 N.E.2d
670, 673 (1965)(Desmond, C.J., dissenting)).
3Bootz, 627 F. Supp. at 99.
305 ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 501.
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tied to the protection of the fifth amendment. 0 6 The
court further stated that traffic violations constituted
"quasi-criminal offenses. "307 The court also noted that Illinois state courts had already extended the fifth amendment privilege to defendants in the closely analogous
cases of municipal ordinance violations.3 0 8 For these reasons, the court concluded that "[u]nder the long-standing
ruling of Boyd v. United States, the [s]elf-[i]ncrimination
privilege applies."30 9
The Bootz court distinguished Ward on the grounds that
Federal Water Pollution Control Act sanctions 310 are primarily compensatory in nature.3 1 ' The court noted that
proceeds derived from the sanctions "were used to repair
the damage due to water pollution, and [were] therefore
more analogous to a civil damage award than a criminal
fine." 3 12 In the case of a fine imposed for a traffic violation, the court concluded, "there is no remedial purpose
to the fine imposed and it is simply intended as a
31 3
punishment.1
In addition to its punitive nature, decertification is
properly quasi-criminal because it is more closely analogous to the Boyd property forfeiture than a civil damages
award. Arguably, the pilot's rights in his certificate rise to
the level of a legal entitlement amounting to a constitutionally protected property interest.314 Such interests, the
-o Bootz, 627 F. Supp. at 101. In language reminiscent of Boyd, Rule 501 of the
Illinois Supreme Court also recognizes the dual nature of such proceedings.
Therein, the court states that while traffic offenses are "not violations of the general criminal laws," they are a "hybrid class of regulatory and penal offenses."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 501 (1985 Historical Notes).
-7
Bootz, 627 F. Supp. at 100.
- Bootz, 627 F. Supp. at 100 (citing Hoban v. Rochford, 73 I1. App. 3d 671,
392 N.E.2d 88 (1979); City of Chicago v. Lord, 3 111. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E.2d 439
(1954)).
- Bootz, 627 F. Supp. at 100.
-o 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1988).
si Bootz, 627 F. Supp. at 100-01.
312 Id. at 100.
s Id. at 100-01.
314 Chalkboard, Inc. v. Brandt, 902 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
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Court has held, must exceed the mere "abstract need or
desire" for the rights, and instead represent a "legitimate
claim of entitlement. 3 1 5 Legitimate claims of entitlement,
in turn, are created by "existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state
law." '3 16 Under this standard, contracts or statutes providing for the revocation of rights or privileges only "for
cause" are typically considered to confer some degree of
property rights.31 7
The Act arguably creates an entitlement in the pilot's
certificate as it confines the government's discretion to revoke or suspend the rights of the pilot and generates the
expectation that certificates will be renewed in the absence of good cause for denial. While providing for the
periodic re-examination of airmen, the Act allows revocation or suspension of licenses only if required for safety in
air commerce or transportation or the public interest.31 8
Furthermore, courts have already applied this reasoning
to several analogous proceedings. Proceedings to revoke
a drivers license3 1 9 or a permit to operate a day care
center, 2 ° for example, must provide the defendant with
some minimum quantum of due process. The analysis is
the entitlement is termed a "right"
unaffected by whether
32
or a "privilege." '
Significantly, the Act impliedly concedes the pilot's entitlement by establishing extensive proceedings to ensure
that pilots receive notice as well as the opportunity to be
heard prior to any deprivation of their rights.32 2 Further315 Board
316Id.; see

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
3,7 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
This analysis recognizes
that such pacts generate expectations that deserve constitutional protection. The
purpose of the "ancient institution of property," the Court has stated, is to "protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives." Roth, 408 U.S. at
577. According to the Court, that reliance "must not be arbitrarily undermined."
Id.
318 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).

silBell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
320

31
22

Chalkboard, 902 F.2d at 1377.

Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a).
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more, while the fourteenth amendment does not encompass the self-incrimination privilege, the notion of
punishing an individual on the weight of his own testimony is incompatible with the broader notions of fairness
embodied in that amendment. In fact, in light of the Act's
extensive notice and hearing provisions, the extension of
the self-incrimination privilege is a minimal additional
burden.
In Roach, the Tenth Circuit rejected the pilot's claims
that the suspension hearing was quasi-criminal for the
same reasons that it concluded that the proceedings were
not criminal. 3 " Specifically, the court found a lack of punitive legislative intent and a "lack of any evident danger
that Roach will prejudice himself in respect to later criminal proceedings. 3 24 This reasoning is suspect for several
reasons. First, the court placed great reliance on the legislative intent behind the statute. This again affords excessive deference to the intent of the legislature, and for
reasons already enumerated, is inappropriate to the role
of the court.325
Furthermore, the court's reference to future criminal
proceedings is puzzling. 326 This consideration is more
properly confined to the invocation of the witness' privilege. 327 The Boyd decision, for example, does not advert
to any risk of future criminal prosecution.3 28 Moreover, to
the extent that it does merit consideration, this factor
weighs heavily in favor of quasi-criminal classification.
Specifically, in Colorado, Roach's state of residence, the
reckless operation of an airplane is a crime. In fact, the
state has prosecuted individuals for the violation of this
standard. 2 9 If Colorado had charged and prosecuted
Roach, 804 F.2d at 1155.
Id. at 1155 n.8.
32. See supra notes 251-264 and accompanying text.
326 Roach, 804 F.2d at 1155 n.8.
327 See supra notes 103 - 141 and accompanying text.
328 See Clark, supra note 144, at 417.
,2 People v. Agnew, 113 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1941). In Agnew, the Colorado
Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statute making it a misdemeanor to oper323
324
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Roach under this statute, he would have been entitled to
all the protections of constitutional criminal procedure.
Thus, much like Boyd, Roach is a case in which the defendant faced forfeiture by reason of an offense. Unlike the
Boyd court, however, the Tenth Circuit allowed the form
of the proceeding to effectively dictate the defendant's
constitutional rights.
D.

The Witness' Privilege

Finally, the courts and administrative tribunals should
accede to the invocation of the witness' privilege by a pilot
facing decertification. Under the Court's more recent
pronouncements, the defendant's expectation of future
criminal prosecution need only be such that he "reasonably believes" that his testimony could prejudice him in
later criminal proceedings. 33 0 Furthermore, testimony
should be compelled only if it "clearly appears to the
court that [the witness] is mistaken."133 ' Reckless operation of an aircraft is a criminal offense in many states, and
there is no reason to believe that states could not use information revealed in a decertification proceeding to indict pilots on criminal charges.
In People v. Agnew, 3 32 for example, the state of Colorado
charged the defendant pilot with the crimes of "low" and
"imminently dangerous" flying, in violation of state
law.3 3
Analogizing to motor vehicle laws, the state
supreme court affirmed the conviction as a valid exercise
of the state's police power.334 Similarly, a recent Second
Circuit opinion holds that in order for the privilege to attach, a witness in a federal administrative or judicial proate an aircraft in a manner "imminently dangerous to persons or property." Id.
at 425. Noting that the regulation of aircraft is "not substantially different from
. . .regulating the manner of driving automobiles," the court found that such a
statute was well within the police powers of the state. Id. at 426.
3Kasigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45.
3,
Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
"
113 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1941).
3s Id.at 425.
3,

Id. at 426.
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ceeding need merely establish that state authorities would
have access to the testimony and that they could legally
use it. 3" 5 In the absence of a grant of immunity, there is
no reason to believe that the testimony of the pilot may be
unavailable to the state.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for the trial courts to construe broadly the fifth amendment's protection. The selfincrimination privilege, the Court has stated, reflects the
nation's most "fundamental values and aspirations, and
marks an important advance in the development of our
liberty."' "3 6 It must, the Court has stated, be "accorded
liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to
secure."33 7 One of the primary goals of the fifth amendment is the preservation of an equitable "state-individual
balance by requiring the government to... shoulder the
entire load.""13 8 The notion of decertification proceeding
solely, or even largely, on the weight of the pilot's own
testimony offends this delicate balance.
Furthermore, the benefits of extending the privilege far
outweigh any additional costs it might impose. The Act
already provides a great deal of due process to defendant
pilots. Moreover, any additional burdens should be con3 39
sidered in light of the nation's "fundamental values.
In Hoffman, for example, the Court stated that while its
holding might add to the government's "burden of diligence and efficiency," the contrary conclusion would "sean
important constitutional
riously compromise
340
'
potential evils of comand
immediate
"The
liberty.
pulsory self-disclosure," the Court concluded, "transcend
any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of
3-5 In re GrandJury Proceeding (United States v. Buckley) 860 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1988).
-36 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444 (footnotes omitted).
3-, Hoffan, 341 U.S. at 486.
38 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
3-9 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444.
-0 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 489-90.
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crime."s41

In Roach, the court noted that the pilot presented no
"facts as to whether [future criminal] prosecution is likely
or even possible on the basis of the statements he made at
the hearing. '3 42 This objection hollowly echoes in light
of the minimal showing required by the Court to establish
entitlement to the privilege. Even under the more restrictive Marchetti standard, had Roach specifically invoked the
witness' privilege in response to the questions at issue,
the fifth amendment should have provided Roach protection. Because reckless flying is a crime in Colorado, his
testimony was coextensive with that necessary to establish
a crime. It is difficult to imagine circumstances engendering a more reasonable fear of future criminal prosecution. 43 Furthermore, the record contains no indication
that the ALJ attempted to compel Roach's testimony
through a grant of immunity or that it would not be available to state aviation authorities.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Tenth Circuit notwithstanding,
there is an appropriate role for the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in pilot decertification proceedings. Courts and scholars alike have agreed that the
defendant in a punitive proceeding should be afforded
protection from self-incrimination. In Ward, the Court
made clear that punitive sanctions may be characterized
by either a punitive legislative intent or a punitive purpose and effect. While decertification is part of an extensive regulatory scheme, it is not remedial in any regard. It
Id.
Roach, 804 F.2d at 1152 n.5.
-3
Admittedly, Agnew, the only reported instance of a prosecution for such an
offense, was forty five years old. Given, however, that the Colorado statute remained on the books, prosecution remained a viable possibility. The court should
not require that the witness become acquainted with the state's historical efforts,
or lack thereof, to enforce its own laws. Because Roach was subject to sanction
under that statute at the discretion of the state, he should be entitled to rely on it
in claiming the self-incrimination privilege.
34
-2
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is, by its nature, punishment for a legal transgression.
Many certificate actions are totally unrelated to the pilot's
technical qualifications. They are not, for example, imposed to allow time for the correction of a dangerous defect. In fact, the FAA has explicitly stated that certificate
actions may be imposed for purely disciplinary reasons,
and the courts have strongly supported this position.
Any remedial effect of decertification is derived from
its deterrent impact. No FAA statistics suggest that formerly suspended pilots are less likely to endanger the
public safety. This is especially apparent in the case of
perfectly qualified pilots who have been suspended for
purely disciplinary reasons. To the extent that any such
diminishment is achieved, it is attributable to the deterrence created by the sanctions. Significantly, the Supreme
Court has noted that deterrence is not a legitimate, nonpunitive government objective.
Unlike typical civil damage awards, certificate actions
do not serve any compensatory function. In contrast to
the sanctions at issue in Ward, it does not follow that
decertification reimburses the injured party for any of its
losses. Decertification is a non-monetary sanction. The
alleged injury is intangible and incapable of accurate measure. In addition, because the sanction cannot be rationally related to the offense, it is necessarily overbroad.
Under current standards, overbroad remedial sanctions
are punitive in effect.
Even in the event that the court does find a remedial
legislative intent, a sanction clearly punitive in its effect
may be criminal nonetheless. The courts, however, have
demanded the clearest proof of this punitive impact. As
previously noted, this analysis is objectionable for its excessive deference to a perceived legislative intention. In
determining the availability of constitutional rights on the
basis of Congressional preference, the Court neglects its
role as the protector of constitutional rights. Because the
Constitution defines the limits of governmental power,
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Congress must not be permitted to dictate the contours of
Constitutional rights without close judicial scrutiny.
If congresional preference is worthy ofjudicial note, reliance on legislative history to ascertain such intent is ineffective. It is inaccurate at best, and because it is
composed of the highly politicized remarks of only a few
individuals, rarely, if ever, may it be said to truly reflect
the intent of Congress as a whole. In fact, the Court has
explicitly rejected such reliance in many other contexts.
Under the Boyd doctrine, decertification need not be a
traditional criminal proceeding in order to extend the
fifth amendment privilege to the defendant pilot. The
Court has made it very clear that the fifth amendment is
unlike other constitutional protections. It is, for example,
345
"broader" 3 44 and entitled to "broad construction.
Consequently, it is applicable to proceedings that the
Court has recognized are not technically criminal in nature. These quasi-criminal proceedings are frequently hybrids of a dual regulatory and penal nature; their common
characteristic is a punitive purpose or effect.
Decertification fits neatly into the quasi-criminal paradigm. First, it is a punitive sanction. As noted above, the
FAA has argued and the courts have sustained the power
of the Administrator to prosecute certificate actions without regard for the pilot's qualifications and for purely disciplinary reasons. Decertification is analogous to the Boyd
property forfeiture in that it represents the loss of property rights by reason of an illegal act. Because of the severe constraints on the power of the Administrator to
revoke the pilot's certificate rights, the pilot's claims rise
to the level of an entitlement. This level of expectation
should be recognized and protected by the courts.
An implicit, unifying theme of the quasi-criminal cases
is the intuitive feeling of the courts that a forfeiture based
on the defendant's own testimony is, at a minimum, unHelvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3 (1938).
- Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).

-4

356

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[57

fair, and is in some sense unconstitutional. Indeed, it is
difficult to reconcile the extensive care taken to provide
the defendant pilot with a great measure of due process in
such instances with the willingness of the courts to allow
the compulsion of self-incriminatory testimony. While
the fourteenth amendment due process clause does not
require the extension of the self-incrimination privilege, it
does contain broad notions of fair play and a careful balancing of government and individual interests, both of
which are offended by the refusal of the courts to extend
the protection of the fifth amendment to pilot decertification proceedings.
Regardless of the blanket protection of the defendant's
privilege, there is little question that pilots should be extended the right to refuse specific inquiries that pose a
threat of future criminal prosecution. Under current standards, a "reasonable fear" of future criminal prosecution
which is not merely "trifling" should entitle the pilot to
invoke the privilege in the absence of a grant of immunity.
To the extent that the criminal laws of a given state impose duties and obligations on pilots, they should be privileged from disclosing information co-extensive with that
needed to establish a crime under state law, while the corresponding evidentiary showing required by the court
should be minimal.

